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Abstract
CZF is a system of set theory which, over classical logic, is equivalent to ZF, while
over intuitionistic logic, it has a well-known constructive type-theoretic interpretation. This
article introduces a simpler, intuitive family of constructive interpretations: sets are well-
founded extensional computable conditional enumerations of sets. One interpretation in
this family is just this: all sets are inductively built from ∅ by iterating the construction
{fn | n ∈ N ∧ gn = hn}, where, in turn, g and h are computable sequences of sets, and
f is a computable sequence such that fn is a set when gn and hn are extensionally equal.
Extended Church’s Thesis, an assumption which is incompatible with classical logic, is
required to make this a model of CZF. Besides its foundational interest, it yields direct
conservativity proofs for certain choice principles, the Subcountability axiom, and for some
so-called Omniscience principles, including first-order arithmetic Omniscience. A larger
interpretation in this family also models the Regular Extension Axiom.
Keywords: Constructive set theory, realizability interpretation, conservativity results.
MSC: 03F50
1 Introduction
Set theory studies more or less arbitrary collections that are well-founded and extensional. It
provides a simple, unifying framework for all mathematics; for ordinary classical mathematics,
the formal system of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with Choice (ZFC), suffices. From the point
of view of constructive and predicative mathematics, ZFC is not suitable, but can be made so
with remarkably little change. To this end, constructive Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory (CZF) was
introduced by Aczel. Over classical logic, CZF has the same theorems as Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory without Choice (ZF), and in fact its axiomatisation is not far from the way ZF is usually
axiomatised.
To briefly describe the differences between ZF to CZF: most importantly of course CZF
uses intuitionistic logic, so the principle of the Excluded Middle (EM) is absent. Extensionality,
Pairing, Union, and Infinity are left as is. Replacement, Foundation, and Power Set in ZF
become Strong Collection, Bounded Separation, Set Induction, and Subset Collection in CZF
[1, §2]
These substitutions are of no effect classically. Constructively, unacceptable principles are
weakened. Foundation can be made acceptable by a contraposition: no inhabited set intersects
all of its elements. Power Set can be made acceptable by switching to Exponentiation: given
two sets, there is a set of all functions from one set to the other. This is weaker since construc-
tively there is no “set of all truth values” to exponentiate. But these can then acceptably be
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strengthened. Constructive Foundation becomes Set Induction; the latter does not follow from
the former constructively. Exponentiation becomes Subset Collection. Replacement can also be
strengthened to Strong Collection and Bounded Separation. Separation does not follow from
Replacement constructively.
The infamous axiom of Choice is dropped entirely in CZF, but the principle of Dependent
Choices is widely used even in constructive and predicative mathematics, and is often taken as an
additional axiom on top of CZF. Two strengthenings of it are used as well. One is Relativised
Dependent Choices (RDC) [1, §8.2], extending over classes instead of just sets. Classically this
is redundant, being just a consequence of DC. Another is the Presentation principle [1, §8.3],
which asserts that every set is the image of a so-called base. This is also known as the existence
of Enough Projectives (EP) in the category of sets. Not much is known about EP classically.
It is a consequence of full Choice, it implies DC, and the latter implication cannot be reversed;
Rathjen remarks, however, that it is an open problem whether EP implies full Choice [14, §5].
It is not claimed that the axioms of CZF are self-evidently constructively or predicatively
acceptable. (It is not self-evident that they are classically acceptable, for that matter.) Rather,
as shown by Aczel, they have an interpretation in Martin-Lo¨f’s type-theoretic framework [2],
which also provides an interpretation for RDC and EP [3]. Martin-Lo¨f’s framework is a logic-
free system of constructions that can be given a strong justification on its own [11]; alternately,
a computational interpretation of sets can be obtained essentially by composition of the inter-
pretation of sets in terms of types with a computational interpretation of types [4, §XII].
This article introduces a simplified and more intuitive approach to the computational inter-
pretation of sets, and also explicitly states the numerical principles on which the interpretation
depends. The general definition of a set is just this:
Definition 1.1 Sets are well-founded extensional computable conditional enumerations of sets.
Specifically:
• If p is a computable sequence of Meaningful conditions, and f is a computable sequence
such that fn is a set if pn is True, then {fn | n∈N ∧ (pn is True)} is a set.
• All sets are built inductively in this way.
• Extensional equality between sets has the expected recursive definition.
This definition is more specific than the classical concept, but by itself it is still too vague to be
constructively useful, as it makes reference to Meaning and Truth. Fortunately, no insight into
these great open problems of philosophy will be required. Instead, they should be treated as
undefined words (and will be kept capitalised). The utility of this definition comes from the fact
that usable set theory can be derived using relatively straightforward assumptions on Meaning.
In particular, if the Meaningful conditions are taken to be extensional equations between two
prior sets (plus a trivially false condition to get the induction off the ground), then a simple and
mathematically precise definition is obtained:
Definition 1.2
• ∅ is a set.
• If g and h are computable sequences of sets, and if f is a computable sequence such that
fn is a set if gn = hn, then {fn | n∈N ∧ gn = hn} is a set.
• All sets are built inductively from ∅ in this way.
• Extensional equality between sets has the expected recursive definition.
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To complete this definition needs only familiar and precise concepts: computability, inductive
definition, as well as the meaning of extensional equality and the set builder notations. The
inductive definition is no longer a strict accessibility definition, since extensional equality now
interacts with the generating clauses for sets. Still, this has an intuitive justification: extensional
equality is recursively defined in terms of prior sets. This is the same intuition that motivates
the schema of simultaneous inductive-recursive definition [7], and in fact this definition will be
shown to fit into that schema.
A computable sequence of natural numbers can of course be coded by a natural number, so
this can be expressed entirely in terms of natural numbers. It can be formalised in first-order
arithmetic with intuitionistic logic (Heyting arithmetic, HA) plus some axioms for the inductive-
recursive definition. It leaves no ambiguity as to what a set is. And, with the assistance of
Extended Church’s Thesis (ECT), all of CZF+RDC+EP can be proven from it. ECT is
incompatible with classical logic, but it is well-known to be conservative over HA, and will be
shown to also be conservative over the inductive-recursive axioms.
Definition 1.1, on the other hand, allows progressively stronger assumptions on Meaning, and
is easier to work with formally. This paper will therefore deal mainly with sets as general well-
founded extensional computable conditional enumerations. Section 2 starts with no assumptions
on Meaning whatsoever, and establishes the logical infrastructure of set theory. In section 3,
with only trivial assumptions on Meaning, the basic sets are constructed. In section 4, ECT is
added to these trivial assumptions, and almost all ofCZF+RDC+EP is proven. A non-trivial
assumption on Meaning in section 5 allows the proof to be completed.
In section 6 it is shown that the proof of EP can in fact be strengthened to show the existence
of Enough Subcountable Projectives (ESP). This results in consequences that are incompatible
with ZFC, and some basic ones are listed.
The next three sections go backwards. Sections 7 reverses the interpretation back into CZF,
providing direct proofs of conservativity results for RDC and ESP. Section 8 gives a different
reversal into ID1, a classical theory of inductive definitions. Section 9 takes up Definition 1.2,
and shows that it is subsumed under Definition 1.1 under exactly the assumptions of section 5.
Then, section 10 continues beyond CZF with an even stronger assumption on Meaning to
capture Aczel’s Regular Extension axiom (REA), and section 11 reverses the new interpretation
back into CZF+REA.
Finally section 12 discusses ECT, and proves conservativity for some restricted forms of EM
called Omniscience principles, such as the decidability of all sentences of first-order arithmetic and
of the well-foundedness of computable relations. These may be of interest from a weakly Platonist
perspective which attributes objectively determinate truth or falsity to statements involving
natural numbers, but not necessarily to those involving arbitrary sets of natural numbers, or
involving sets in general.
2 Logical principles
From now on, for clarity, the term “v-set” will be used to denote the numerical code for a set
according to Definition 1.1. In addition to the language of first-order arithmetic, there will be
three unary predicates, V ,M, and T . V(x) is to be read “x is a v-set”,M(p) is to be read “p is
a Meaningful condition”, and T (p) is to be read “p is a True condition”. With these, it can be
specified exactly how a sentence in the language of first-order set theory is to be interpreted.
The Cantor pairing function from N2 to N will be denoted by the binary bracket 〈·, ·〉. (·)L and
(·)R denote the corresponding left and right projections. The Kuratowski set-theoretic ordered
pair will be denoted 〈◦·, ·◦〉 to distinguish it from the number-theoretic ordered pair. The coding
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of a natural number as a v-set (finite von Neumann ordinal) will be denoted n, to distinguish it
from n as a natural number.
Kleene’s T predicate and U function will be used. T(e, i, o) asserts that the computation of
the eth function on input i terminates, and that U(o) is its output. Function application will be
written by juxtaposition; the sentence ei↓ means that ∃o∈N. T(e, i, o), and the partial term ei
is equal to U(o) in that case (and will only be used in contexts where it is defined). The term
Λn.τ(n) is a number for the function computing the expression τ .
The convention that a quantifier binds as far to the right as possible is adopted. A period
will be placed after the quantifier as a reminder of this.
The predicate V is inductively defined following Definition 1.1. First introduce an abbre-
viation x ⋄ n for the nth condition of the v-set x, and x [n] for its nth conditional element, as
follows:
x ⋄ n = (xn)R
x [n] = (xn)L
(A slight liberty is taken with Definition 1.1, in that the pair of computable sequences has been
switched for a computable sequence of pairs.) Assume:
∀x∈N. (∀n∈N. xn↓ ∧M(x ⋄ n) ∧ (T (x ⋄ n)→ V(x [n])))→ V(x) (2.1)
(∀x∈N. (∀n∈N. xn↓ ∧M(x ⋄ n) ∧ (T (x ⋄ n)→ φ(x [n])))→ φ(x))→ (∀x∈N. V(x)→ φ(x))
(2.2)
(2.2) is a schema in φ. The predicates M and T are for the moment completely unspecified, as
discussed in the previous section. Otherwise, V is just given by an accessibility definition, which
is immediately constructively valid.
IND will be an abbreviation for the indices for which the conditions of a v-set are True, and
EL will abbreviate the elements of a v-set, defined as follows:
IND(x) = {n ∈ N | T (x ⋄ n)}
EL(x) = {x [n] | n ∈ IND(x)}
To be clear, IND(x) and EL(x) are subclasses of N rather than v-sets in the sense being defined
here. In particular, membership in EL(x) does not respect extensionality, rather, it ranges over
the “intensional members” x [n]. Finally, for quantification over all v-sets, define V as another
subclass of N as follows:
V = {n ∈ N | V(n)}
For clarity, ≃ will represent the extensional equality between v-sets. The regular = will
represent the decidable, intensional equality between natural numbers. For ≃ it will be necessary
to introduce a temporary fix-point definition. Assume:
∀x, y∈N. V(x) ∧ V(y)→ (x ≃ y ↔(∀a∈EL(x). ∃b∈EL(y). a ≃ b)
∧(∀b∈EL(y). ∃a∈EL(x). b ≃ a))
(2.3)
This assumption is subsumed in section 5. For the membership relation, it will be more con-
venient not to take it as primitive. Rather, there will be two types of primitive quantifiers,
bounded quantifiers over a v-set, interpreted as ranging over EL(x), and unbounded quantifiers,
interpreted as ranging over V. x ∈ y is defined as ∃x′ ∈ y. x ≃ x′. With these, the formal
interpretation of set theory is complete.
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Theorem 2.1 (Extensionality) If two v-sets have equal members, they are equal.
Proof : Given the above interpretation, (2.3) is in fact:
∀x, y∈V. x ≃ y ↔ (∀a∈x. a ∈ y) ∧ (∀b∈y. b ∈ x)

Theorem 2.2 (Set Induction) If a predicate applies to a v-set whenever it applies to all its
members, then the predicate applies to all v-sets.
Proof : The inductive definition of V was chosen to make it so. For, if φ applies to a v-set
whenever it applies to all its members, then:
∀x∈V. (∀y∈x. φ(y))→ φ(x)
which means,
∀x∈N. V(x)→ (∀y∈EL(x). φ(y))→ φ(x)
Define the predicate φ′ as:
φ′(x) ⇐⇒ V(x)→ φ(x)
Note that the elements of a v-set are themselves v-sets. So:
∀x∈N. (∀y∈EL(x). φ′(y))→ φ′(x)
which expands to
∀x∈N. (∀n∈N. T (x ⋄ n)→ φ′(x [n]))→ φ′(x)
Furthermore V(x)→ (∀n∈N. xn↓ ∧M(x ⋄ n)), so,
∀x∈N. (∀n∈N. xn↓ ∧M(x ⋄ n) ∧ (T (x ⋄ n)→ φ′(x [n])))→ φ′(x)
This is the form to which (2.2) applies, so,
∀x∈N. V(x)→ φ′(x)
So finally,
∀x∈V. φ(x)

Remark: This is the only place where the full strength of assumption (2.2) is used. By restricting
the predicates to which induction applies in (2.2), it may therefore be possible to obtain a
version of this interpretation which validates CZF with a correspondingly restricted form of Set
Induction, and this would have a predicative justification in the stricter sense of Schu¨tte and
Feferman [8].
Lemma 2.3 Extensional equality is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive.
Proof : Symmetry is immediate from the fix-point definition of ≃. Reflexivity and transitivity
are shown by Set Induction. Suppose, for an inductive hypothesis, that each element of a v-set
is equal to itself. It then follows from the fix-point definition of ≃ that the v-set is equal to itself.
Given v-sets x and z, suppose, for a doubly inductive hypothesis, that for any a in x and c in z,
if there is a b such that a ≃ b∧ b ≃ c, then a ≃ c. If there is a y such that x ≃ y ∧ y ≃ z then for
any a in x, there is a b in y such that a ≃ b, and for that b there is a c in z such that b ≃ c, so
by hypothesis a ≃ c. Conversely for every c in z there is an a in x such that c ≃ a. So, x ≃ z. 
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Lemma 2.4 Extensional equality has the substitution property for sentences of first-order set
theory.
Proof : Proceed by induction on the structure of the formula. The base case is equality between
two v-sets, and this is given by the previous lemma. For the propositional connectives and
unbounded quantifiers it follows from intuitionistic predicate logic. What has to be considered
is whether bounded quantification over extensionally equivalent domains is equivalent. So, given
x ≃ y, take for inductive hypothesis that
∀u∈x. ∀v∈y. u ≃ v → (φ(x, u)↔ φ(y, v))
It must be shown that
(∃u∈x. φ(x, u))↔ (∃v∈y. φ(y, v))
and that
(∀u∈x. φ(x, u))↔ (∀v∈y. φ(y, v))
So, for the existential quantifier, suppose ∃u∈EL(x). φ(x, u). Now x ≃ y so ∀u∈EL(x). ∃v ∈
EL(y). u ≃ v, so using the inductive hypothesis, it follows that ∃v ∈ EL(y). φ(y, v) as re-
quired. The other direction works the same way. For the universal quantifier, suppose ∀u ∈
EL(x). φ(x, u). Now x ≃ y, so ∀v ∈ EL(y). ∃u ∈ EL(x). v ≃ u, so again using the inductive
hypothesis, it follows that ∀v∈EL(y). φ(y, v), as required, and again the other direction works
the same way. 
Lemma 2.5 Over formulas of first-order set theory, bounded quantification is equivalent to its
usual definition in terms of unbounded quantification and the membership relation.
Proof : Usually, they are defined as
(∃y∈x. φ(y)) ⇐⇒ (∃y∈V. (y ∈ x) ∧ φ(y))
(∀y∈x. φ(y)) ⇐⇒ (∀y∈V. (y ∈ x)→ φ(y))
Whereas in this interpretation, the bounded quantifiers range over EL, and y ∈ x means ∃y′ ∈
EL(x). y ≃ y′. So the existential case becomes ∃y ∈ EL(x). φ(y) on the left-hand side and
∃y ∈ V. ∃y′ ∈ EL(x). y ≃ y′ ∧ φ(y). As noted above, EL does not respect extensionality.
Nevertheless, in the case where φ is a formula of first-order set theory, the previous lemma
applies, together with the fact that the elements of a v-set are v-sets, to show the equivalence.
Similar considerations apply to the universal case. 
Theorem 2.6 If V is taken as the domain of discourse, extensional equality is taken as the equal-
ity relation, and the membership relation is taken as the only other predicate, then intuitionistic
predicate logic with equality is valid.
Proof : Intuitionistic predicate logic is valid for number theory. Extensional equality has the
correct properties for equality. The propositional connectives are interpreted as themselves. The
unbounded quantifiers are simply quantifying over N and relativised to the inhabited predicate
V . Finally, the bounded quantifiers are equivalent to their usual definitions. 
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3 Basic constructions
To proceed, some temporary, trivial assumptions aboutM and T are made. These assumptions
are subsumed in section 5.
Definition 3.1 ⊤ is a Meaningful condition which is True, and ⊥ is a Meaningful condition
which is not True. Π(p, q) is a condition which asserts that both p and q are True; it is Meaningful
if p is a Meaningful condition, and if p being True would imply that q is a Meaningful condition.
Theorem 3.2 (Empty Set) There is a v-set with no elements.
Proof : It is given by:
∅ = Λn.〈z,⊥〉
z is an irrelevant constant. 
Theorem 3.3 (Pairing) For any two v-sets, there is a v-set with those two v-sets as elements.
Proof : If x and y are sets, their pairing can be given by:
{x, y} = Λn.
{
〈x,⊤〉, if n is even
〈y,⊤〉, if n is odd

Lemma 3.4 Definition 1.1 extends to computable partial sequences, as follows: suppose x is
a computable partial sequence such that, for all n, if xn is defined then x ⋄ n is a Meaningful
condition, and if furthermore x ⋄ n is True then x [n] is a v-set. Then Dx = {x [n] | n ∈
N ∧ xn↓ ∧ (x ⋄ n is True)} is a v-set.
Proof : Define:
T0(x, n, u, p) =
{
p if T(x, n, u)
⊥ otherwise
Dx = Λn.〈U(nR)L, T0(x, nL, nR,U(nR)R)〉
This will meet the requirements. For,
Dx ≃ {U(nR)L | n∈N ∧ T (T0(x, nL, nR,U(nR)R))}
≃ {U(u)L | n, u∈N ∧ T (T0(x, n, u,U(u)R))}
≃ {U(u)L | n, u∈N ∧T(x, n, u) ∧ T (U(u)R)}
≃ {(xn)L | n∈N ∧ xn↓ ∧ T ((xn)R)}
≃ {x [n] | n∈N ∧ xn↓ ∧ T (x ⋄ n)}

Theorem 3.5 (Union) Given a v-set x, there is a v-set whose elements are the elements of the
elements of x.
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Proof : The required v-set is given by:⋃
x = DΛn.〈x [nL] [nR] ,Π(x ⋄ nL, x [nL] ⋄ nR)〉
y is an element of
⋃
x if and only if there is an n such that Π(x ⋄ nL, x [nL] ⋄ nR) is True and
y ≃ x [nL] [nR]; this means there is an n and an m such that Π(x ⋄ n, x [n] ⋄ m) is True and
y ≃ x [n] [m]. By the Truth conditions of Π, this means that x ⋄ n and x [n] ⋄m are True. The
Truth of x ⋄ n means that x [n] an element of x, and the Truth of x [n] ⋄m means that x [n] [m]
is an element of x [n]. So, the elements of
⋃
x are indeed the elements of the elements of x. 
Remark: The asymmetry in Definition 3.1 for Π to be Meaningful is used here: x [n] ⋄m can
only be assumed to be Meaningful when x [n] is a v-set, which can only be assumed when x ⋄ n
is True. Indeed x [n] ⋄m can only be assumed to be defined when x ⋄ n is True, so the Lemma
3.4 must apply.
Theorem 3.6 (Infinity) There is an inhabited v-set such that each of its elements is also an
element of one of its elements.
Proof : The first infinite von Neumann ordinal, ω, is such a v-set:
ω = Λn.〈fn,⊤〉
where f maps the natural number n to the v-set n, and can be given by general recursion:
f = Λn.Λm.〈fm,A(m,n)〉
A(m,n) =
{
⊤ if m < n
⊥ if m ≥ n
By ordinary induction (induction over N), all the n’s are v-sets, and therefore so is ω. 
4 The red pill
So far Extended Church’s Thesis has not been invoked. The proofs of the previous sections are
valid classically and constructively. To proceed to prove the classically unprovable principles of
Replacement, Exponentiation, Dependent Choices, and Enough Projectives, it will be necessary
to leave neutral territory.
In constructive mathematics, Church’s Thesis refers to the classically impossible assumption
of Markov’s school of constructivism that all sequences are computable. An even stronger form,
ECT0, was introduced by Troelstra [18]. It is the schema:
(∀n∈N. φ(n)→ ∃m∈N. ψ(n,m))→ ∃e∈N. ∀n∈N. φ(n)→ en↓ ∧ ψ(n, en)
where φ is a so-called almost-negative sentence of arithmetic. ψ is not constrained. The almost-
negative sentences include the Σ1 sentences (existential quantifiers over N directly in front of
quantifier-free formulas of primitive recursive arithmetic) and are closed under conjunction, im-
plication, and universal quantification over N. Note that en↓ is Σ1, therefore almost-negative.
Essentially, ECT0 means that a statement of first-order arithmetic is true if and only if it
has a computable witness, as given by the standard realisability clauses for arithmetic. The
almost-negative sentences are essentially those which are already in the form “e witnesses φ”.
Here an assumption is required that will be called ECTV. It is the same schema as ECT0,
but the class of almost-negative sentences allowed in the antecedent is expanded to include the
8
new predicates V ,M, and T . The choice of defining assumptions for these predicates will make
it possible to consider them almost-negative, as later shown by Meta-theorems 7.4 and 11.5.
The assumption that T is almost-negative means that only almost-negative sentences can
be considered Meaningful. This is not entirely faithful to the informal reading of “meaningful”,
but from the point of view of set theory, this restriction results in no loss of generality, since
ECTV allows any sentence to be converted into a single existential quantifier over N in front
of an almost-negative sentence, and {fn | n ∈ N ∧ ∃e ∈ N. φ(e, n)} is extensionally equal to
{f(nL) | n∈N ∧ φ(nL, nR)}. (Actually Definition 1.2 is an example of this, see section 9.)
The relation ≃ cannot be considered almost-negative and so cannot appear in the antecedent
of ECTV. Instead a new temporary predicate R is defined as a fix-point:
∀x, y∈V. R(e, x, y) ↔ (∀n∈IND(x). eLn↓ ∧ (eLn)L ∈ IND(y)
∧ R((eLn)R, x [n] , y [(eLn)L]))
∧ (∀n∈IND(y). eRn↓ ∧ (eRn)L ∈ IND(x)
∧ R((eRn)R, y [n] , x [(eRn)L]))
(4.1)
Essentially R(e, x, y) says that e witnesses x ≃ y. Lemma 4.6 below shows that ≃ can be defined
in terms of R, and so the assumption (2.3) is no longer needed. Here it will have to be assumed
that R is almost-negative. This is justified in the next section where R will be defined in terms
of T .
Other than the two meta-theorems mentioned above, realisability will not be used explicitly;
it will all be implicitly contained in ECTV. Also, the other principle used by Markov’s school,
namely Markov’s principle, will not be used at all. Finally, the adjective “computable” is now
vacuous and will be dropped.
Theorem 4.1 (Strong Collection) Suppose ψ is an arbitrary binary relation (not necessarily
a v-set), x is a v-set, and to every element of x there is at least one v-set related to it by ψ.
Then there is a v-set which contains, for each element of x, at least one v-set related to it, and
contains only such related v-sets.
Proof : The hypothesis is that
∀a∈x. ∃b∈V. ψ(a, b)
which means that
∀n∈IND(x). ∃b∈V. ψ(x [n] , b)
Since IND is defined in terms of T , which is almost-negative, ECTV applies:
∃e∈N. ∀n∈IND(x). en↓ ∧ V(en) ∧ ψ(x [n] , en)
Define:
y = DΛn.〈en, x ⋄ n〉
If x ⋄ n is True then en is defined, so Lemma 3.4 applies. y meets the requirements. For,
y ≃ {en | n ∈ IND(x) ∧ en↓}
The elements of y are equal to en for some n ∈ IND(x). By the properties of e, V(en) and
ψ(x [n] , en), so y is indeed a v-set, and each of its elements is related to some element of x by
ψ. Conversely by the properties of e, en is in fact defined for all n ∈ IND(x), so for any given
element of x, y does contain at least one v-set related to it. 
Remark: ECTV in the above construction cannot guarantee en is a v-set unless x ⋄ n is True.
Since the Truth of this condition is generally not even semi-decidable, e cannot be patched to
output only Valid sets. This is why Definition 1.1 only requires x [n] to be a v-set if x ⋄ n is
True.
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Corollary 4.2 (Replacement) Suppose ψ is an arbitrary binary relation, x is a v-set, and to
every element of x there is exactly one v-set related to it by ψ. Then there is a v-set which
contains all and only the v-sets that are related to some element of x.
Theorem 4.3 (Subset Collection) Suppose x and y are v-sets, and ψ is an arbitrary ternary
relation. For any c, let ψc denote the binary relation resulting from setting c as the third argument
of ψ. Then there is a v-set z which collects all the ψ(x)-subsets of y, in the following sense: for
any v-set c, if to every element of x there is at least one element of y related to it by ψc, then, z
contains a subset of y which in turn contains, for every element of x, at least one element related
to it by ψc, and contains only such related elements.
Proof : Given v-sets x and y, define:
w = Λe.DΛn.〈y [en] ,Π(x ⋄ n, y ⋄ en)〉
z = Λe.〈we,⊤〉
For any e, Lemma 3.4 applies, since x ⋄ n is Meaningful, and if en is defined then y ⋄ en is also
Meaningful, and its Truth implies that y [en] is a v-sets. Therefore we is always a v-set, so z is
a v-set as well. Moreover, we is always a subset of y. Now, suppose c is a v-set, and
∀a∈x. ∃b∈y. ψ(a, b, c)
This means:
∀n∈IND(x). ∃m∈IND(y). ψ(x [n] , y [m] , c)
And again ECTV gives the existence of an e such that:
∀n∈IND(x). en↓ ∧ en ∈ IND(y) ∧ ψ(x [n] , y [m] , c)
Now,
we ≃ {y [en] | n∈N ∧ en↓ ∧ T (x ⋄ n) ∧ T (y ⋄ en)}
≃ {y [en] | n ∈ IND(x) ∧ en↓ ∧ en ∈ IND(y)}
By the properties of e, each element of we is related by ψc to some element of x, and conversely
for each element of x, we has an element which is related to it. In turn, we is an element of z.
So z is a subset collection as required. 
Theorem 4.4 (Enough Projectives) Every v-set x is the image of a v-set y that is “projec-
tive”, meaning that any v-set which is a binary relation whose domain is a superset of y, is itself
the superset of a v-set that is a choice function with domain y.
Proof : Given a v-set x, let f = Λn.〈〈◦n, x [n] ◦〉, x ⋄ n〉 and y = Λn.〈n, x ⋄ n〉. f is a set-theoretic
surjection from y onto x. To see that y is projective, suppose g is a relation as in the hypothesis.
Then:
∀a∈y. ∃b∈V. 〈◦a, b◦〉 ∈ g
And again, ECTV applies to give an e such that:
∀n∈IND(y). en↓ ∧ en ∈ V ∧ 〈◦y [n] , en◦〉 ∈ g
And furthermore y ⋄ n = x ⋄ n and y [n] = n. Define:
h = DΛn.〈〈◦n, en◦〉, x ⋄ n〉
If x ⋄ n is True then en is defined, so Lemma 3.4 applies. All the n’s are distinct, so h is in fact
a function. Moreover it is a subset of g, and its domain is y. It is therefore a choice function as
required. 
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Theorem 4.5 (Dependent Choices) Suppose z is a v-set, ψ is an arbitrary binary relation,
and to every element of z there is an element of z related to it by ψ. Then to every x ∈ z there is
a v-set which is a choice sequence of elements of z (function with domain ω and range a subset
of z) starting with x and such that each successor is related to its predecessor.
Proof : It can be shown to follow from Enough Projectives [1, §8.3], but here, it is simple enough
to construct directly. By hypothesis, ∀u∈z. ∃v∈z. ψ(u, v); apply ECTV to get an e such that:
∀n∈IND(z). en↓ ∧ en ∈ IND(z) ∧ ψ(z [n] , z [en])
Given x ∈ z there is an n0 ∈ IND(z) such that z [n0] ≃ x. Define f by primitive recursion such
that f0 = n0 and f(n+ 1) = e(fn). Then define:
g = Λn.〈〈◦n, z [fn] ◦〉,⊤〉
This v-set is the required choice sequence. 
Lemma 4.6 For any two v-sets x and y, x ≃ y if and only if there is an e such that R(e, x, y).
Proof : Given some e:
R(e, x, y)↔(∀n∈IND(x). eLn↓ ∧ (eLn)L ∈ IND(y) ∧R((eLn)R, x [n] , y [(eLn)L]))
∧(∀n∈IND(y). eRn↓ ∧ (eRn)L ∈ IND(x) ∧R((eRn)R, y [n] , x [(eRn)L]))
Take, for a doubly set-inductive hypothesis, that for any element a of x and any element b of y,
a ≃ b if and only if there is an f such that R(f, a, b). So, if ∃e∈N. R(e, x, y) it follows that:
(∀n∈IND(x). ∃m∈IND(y). x [n] ≃ y [m]) ∧ (∀m∈IND(y). ∃n∈IND(x). y [m] ≃ x [n])
And conversely, by ECTV, the above implies ∃e∈N. R(e, x, y). But the above means that
(∀a∈x. ∃b∈y. a ≃ b) ∧ (∀b∈y. ∃a∈x. b ≃ a)
Which, by (2.3), just means
x ≃ y
So, by Set Induction,
x ≃ y ↔ ∃e∈N. R(e, x, y)

Lemma 4.7 For any sentence φ expressible in the language of first-order set theory, there is an
almost-negative predicate φ′ such that φ ⇐⇒ ∃e∈N. φ′(e).
Proof : This transformation is effected recursively on the structure of φ.
• The transformation of the base case x ≃ y is given by the previous lemma: R(e, x, y).
• The other base case, ⊥, transforms to itself.
• Conjunction, disjunction, and the existential quantifiers are straightforward:
(∃e∈N. φ′(e)) ∧ (∃e∈N. ψ′(e))↔ ∃e∈N. (φ′(eL) ∧ ψ
′(eR))
(∃e∈N. φ′(e)) ∨ (∃e∈N. ψ′(e))↔ ∃e∈N. (eL = 0→ φ
′(eR)) ∧ (eL 6= 0→ ψ
′(eR))
(∃x∈y. ∃e∈N. φ′(e, x))↔ ∃e∈N. T (y ⋄ eL) ∧ φ
′(eR, y [eL])
(∃x∈V. ∃e∈N. φ′(x))↔ ∃e∈N. V(eL) ∧ φ
′(eR, eL)
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• Implication and the universal quantifiers require ECTV for their transformation:
((∃e∈N. φ′(e))→ (∃e∈N. ψ′(e)))↔ ∃e∈N. ∀f ∈N. φ′(f)→ ef↓ ∧ ψ′(ef)
(∀x∈y. ∃e∈N. φ′(e, x))↔ ∃e∈N. ∀n∈N. T (y ⋄ n)→ en↓ ∧ φ′(en, y [n])
(∀x∈V. ∃e∈N. φ′(e, x))↔ ∃e∈N. ∀x∈N. V(x)→ ex↓ ∧ φ′(ex, x)
The resulting formulas are in the right form, given that R, T , and V are almost-negative. 
Theorem 4.8 (Relativised Dependent Choices) Suppose φ is a unary predicate expressible
in the language of first-order set theory (i.e. a class), ψ is an arbitrary binary relation (not
necessarily a class), and to each x satisfying φ there is at least one y satisfying φ that is related
to it by ψ. Then, to every x satisfying φ there is a choice sequence of v-sets, all of which satisfy
φ, starting with x and such that each successor is related to its predecessor by ψ.
Proof : The hypothesis is that:
∀x∈V. φ(x)→ ∃y∈V. φ(y) ∧ ψ(x, y)
φ is not necessarily in a form to which ECTV can be applied. The previous lemma is used to
transform the hypothesis into:
∀x∈V. (∃f ∈N. φ′(f, x))→ ∃y∈V. (∃g∈N. φ′(g, y)) ∧ ψ(x, y)
Applying ECTV to this transformed hypothesis results in an e such that:
∀x∈V. ∀f ∈N. φ′(f, x)→e〈x, f〉↓ ∧ V((e〈x, f〉)L)
∧ φ′((e〈x, f〉)R, (e〈x, f〉)L) ∧ ψ(x, (e〈x, f〉)L)
Now, given a v-set x such that φ(x), there is an f such that φ′(f, x). So define a sequence j by
primitive recursion on e:
j0 = 〈x, f〉
j(n+ 1) = e(jn)
The actual set-theoretic choice sequence is given by:
k = Λn.〈〈◦n, (jn)L◦〉,⊤〉

5 The missing piece
One important principle of CZF is missing: Bounded Separation. For this, a non-trivial assump-
tion on Meaning is needed. Under this assumption it will be shown that R can be defined in
terms of T , so assumption (4.1) from the previous section can be dropped. It will also be shown
that Definition 3.1 is redundant. This will leave just first-order arithmetic, the predicates V ,M,
T , the schema ECTV, the assumptions (2.1) and (2.2), and two more assumptions below, (5.1)
and (5.2).
So far only closure under conjunction was required. To proceed, one may expect that Meaning
will require closure under the remaining propositional connectives and quantifiers. As discussed in
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the previous section, only almost-negative sentences need be considered Meaningful. Σ1 sentences
are therefore taken to be Meaningful, and Meaning is taken to be closed under implication and
universal quantification. The latter means that given a sequence of Meaningful conditions, there
is another Meaningful condition expressing their infinitary conjunction. To simplify the formal
treatment, these are combined into a single operator.
Definition 5.1 Ξ(f, g) is a condition which asserts that, for all n, whenever fn is defined and
True, gn is also defined and True. It is Meaningful if, for all n, when fn is defined, it is
Meaningful, and when fn and gn are defined and fn is True, gn is Meaningful.
It is not hard to see that this captures all of the above, including the asymmetrical Meaning
conditions on Π of Definition 3.1. Now, formal assumptions on M and T are made following
Definition 5.1. Assume:
∀f, g∈N.M(Ξ(f, g))→ (T (Ξ(f, g))↔ (∀n∈N. fn↓ ∧ T (fn)→ gn↓ ∧ T (gn))) (5.1)
∀f, g∈N. (∀n∈N. fn↓ →M(fn)) ∧ (∀n∈N. fn↓ ∧ gn↓ ∧ T (fn)→M(gn))→M(Ξ(f, g))
(5.2)
Theorem 5.2 “Meaningful” is not a Meaningful adjective. That is, there is no µ such that
µ〈n,m〉 is defined and Meaningful for all n and m, and such that n is Meaningful if and only if
there exists an m such that µ〈n,m〉 is True.
Proof : First define:
ν = Λn.Ξ(Λm.n,Λm.⊥)
This is just a negation operator. νn is Meaningful iff n is, and it is True iff n is not True. Now,
if there were a µ satisfying the hypothesis, then an extended negation operator could be defined:
ν˜ = Λn.Ξ(Λm.µ〈n,m〉,Λm.νn)
By hypothesis, µ〈n,m〉 would be Meaningful for all n and m, and if µ〈n,m〉 is True then n is
Meaningful. So, by the Meaning conditions for Ξ, ν˜n would be Meaningful for all n. It would
be True iff n being Meaningful implied that n is not True. Now define by general recursion:
L = ν˜L
And this is a contradiction, because L would be Meaningful, and L would be True iff L were not
True. So, there is no such µ. 
Lemma 5.3 Given a number e and v-sets x and y, there is a Meaningful condition R(e, x, y)
which can be constructed using only the operator Ξ and such that T (R(e, x, y))↔R(e, x, y).
Proof : Define R by general recursion:
R(e, x, y) = Π(H(eL, x, y), H(eR, y, x))
H(e, x, y) = Ξ(Λn.x ⋄ n,Λn.J(n, (en)L, (en)R, x, y))
J(n,m, e, x, y) = Π(y ⋄m,R(e, x [n] , y [m]))
Π can of course be expressed in terms of Ξ.
Now, H(e, x, y) is always defined, so R(e, x, y) is too. Given v-sets x and y, take, for a doubly
set-inductive hypothesis, that R(f, a, b) is Meaningful for all numbers f , all elements a of x, and
all elements b of y. x ⋄ n is always Meaningful; if true, then x [n] is a v-set and an element of x.
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The same goes for y ⋄m are y [m]. By the inductive hypothesis, H(e, x, y) is Meaningful, and so
is R(e, x, y). So by Set Induction R is Meaningful for all v-sets.
Now take for inductive hypothesis that R(f, a, b) has the right Truth conditions for all num-
bers f , all elements a of x, and all elements b of y. The Truth conditions of R(e, x, y) expand
to:
T (R(e, x, y))↔(∀n∈IND(x). eLn↓ ∧ (eLn)L ∈ IND(y) ∧ T (R((eLn)R, x [n] , y [(eLn)L])))
∧(∀n∈IND(y). eRn↓ ∧ (eRn)L ∈ IND(x) ∧ T (R((eRn)R, y [n] , x [(eRn)L])))
This matches (4.1), so, by Set Induction, R has the right Truth conditions. 
Lemma 5.4 (Kronecker Delta) For any two v-sets x and y, there is a v-set which is a subset
of 1 and which is inhabited if and only if x ≃ y.
Proof : It is given by
δxy = Λn.〈0,R(n, x, y)〉
It follows from Lemmas 4.6 and 5.3 that 0 ∈ δxy ↔ x ≃ y, and clearly 0 is the only possible
element of δxy, so δxy ⊆ 1. 
Lemma 5.5 (Infimum) For any v-set x whose elements are all subsets of 1, there is a v-set
which is a subset of 1 and which is inhabited if and only if all the elements of x are inhabited.
Proof : A subset of 1 is inhabited if and only if it is extensionally equal to 1. Use Replacement
to form a v-set x˜ in which all the elements of x are replaced by 1. Then x ≃ x˜ if and only if all
elements of x are inhabited. So, using the previous lemma, δxx˜ is the required infimum. 
Theorem 5.6 (Bounded Separation) Suppose y is a v-set, and φ is a unary predicate which
can be expressed in the language of first-order set theory with only bounded quantifiers (that is,
the quantifiers ∃x∈y. and ∀x∈y. ). Then there is a v-set containing all and only the elements
of y which satisfy φ.
Proof : It can be shown that this follows from Extensionality, Empty Set, Pairing, Union,
Replacement, Kronecker Delta, and Infimum [1, §3.3]. (And in fact Infimum follows from the
others, as shown above.) 
Theorem 5.7 (Exponentiation) For all v-sets x and y, there is a v-set xy of all functions
from x to y.
Proof : Define the relation ψ as
ψ(a, b, c) ⇐⇒ b ∈ c ∧ ∃d∈V. b ≃ 〈◦a, d◦〉
If c is a function from x to y, then every element of x is related to exactly one element of x×y by
ψc, and the collection of all such elements of x × y is c itself. Using Subset Collection it follows
that there is a v-set which is a superset of xy. The property of being a function from x to y can
be expressed by a bounded formula, therefore Bounded Separation applies to get exactly xy. 
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6 Six impossible theorems before breakfast
The results from the previous sections are classically and constructively valid. They are all
theorems of CZF+RDC+EP, which in turn is a sub-theory of ZFC. Conversely, they
axiomatise CZF+RDC+EP. As remarked in section 1, adding the principle of the Ex-
cluded Middle has the following effect: CZF+EM = ZF, CZF+RDC+EM = ZF+DC,
CZF+RDC+EP+EM = ZF+EP; not much is known about the latter, other than that
ZF+DC < ZF+EP ≤ ZFC.
Though the results are valid, the proofs of these results are, in sections 4 and 5, classically
invalid, because ECT contradicts EM. ECT should be expected to have set-theoretic conse-
quences that are incompatible with ZFC. In this section, a few basic ones are mentioned. They
are all fairly straightforward consequences of the first theorem, ESP. As will be shown in the
following section, ESP is conservative over CZF+RDC. This is in contrast with EM, which
is highly non-conservative in this setting: ZF proves the consistency of CZF, indeed, CZF is
provably consistent, by transfinite induction up to the Bachmann-Howard ordinal, while ZF is
far beyond any system for which a constructive consistency proof is known [12].
Theorem 6.1 (Enough Subcountable Projectives) Every v-set is the image of a v-subset
of ω which is also projective.
Proof : Actually, in the construction of Theorem 4.4, the projective v-set was already a subset
of ω. 
Corollary 6.2 (Subcountability) Every v-set is subcountable, that is, the image of a v-subset
of ω.
Theorem 6.3 The Power Set principle is false. In particular, P(ω), the class of all v-subsets of
ω, is a proper class.
Proof : This is an adaptation of Cantor’s diagonal theorem. Suppose P(ω) were a v-set. By
the above, it would be subcountable. There would be an x ⊆ ω and a surjective f : x ։ P(ω).
The “Cantor diagonal set” C = {y ∈ x | y 6∈ f(y)} would be a v-set, by Bounded Separation,
and C ⊆ x ⊆ ω. So by f ’s surjectivity, C ≃ f(z) for some z ∈ x, and it would follow that
z ∈ C↔ z 6∈ C. Contradiction. 
Remark: On the other hand, ωω is a v-set, by Exponentiation. It can be shown, by a different
adaptation of Cantor’s diagonal theorem, that ωω is not countable. But it is subcountable.
Corollary 6.4 Even P(1) is a proper class.
Proof : Suppose P(1) were a v-set. Then for any v-set x, xP(1) would be a v-set, by Exponen-
tiation. But, xP(1) is isomorphic to P(x). Specifically P(x) = {{y ∈ x | 0 ∈ f(y)} | f ∈ xP(1)};
the inner set is a v-set by Bounded Separation, and then P(x) would be a v-set by Replacement.
But ω is a v-set and P(ω) is not, so P(1) is not either. 
Remark: A proof giving a different perspective is that if P(1) were a v-set, then “Meaningful”
would be Meaningful. That is, from a v-set x and a witness that x has the properties of P(1), a
µ which violates Theorem 5.2 can be constructed. This construction is omitted here.
Theorem 6.5 The unrestricted principle of Choice is false.
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Proof : This is an adaptation of Diaconescu’s result [6]. Given any x ⊆ 1, define:
A = {n ∈ 2 | n ≃ 0 ∨ (n ≃ 1 ∧ 0 ∈ x)}
B = {n ∈ 2 | n ≃ 1 ∨ (n ≃ 0 ∧ 0 ∈ x)}
and these are v-sets by Bounded Separation. Applying the principle of Choice to {A,B}, there
would be a choice function f such that f(A) ∈ A ∧ f(B) ∈ B. By definition of these two v-sets,
(f(A) ≃ 0 ∨ (f(A) ≃ 1 ∧ 0 ∈ x)) ∧ (f(B) ≃ 1 ∨ (f(B) ≃ 0 ∧ 0 ∈ x)), from which it would follow
that f(A) 6≃ f(B) ∨ 0 ∈ x. But if 0 ∈ x then by the definitions, A ≃ B, and by Extensionality,
f(A) ≃ f(B). So f(A) 6≃ f(B) → 0 6∈ x, and as a result 0 6∈ x ∨ 0 ∈ x. So x ≃ 0 ∨ x ≃ 1, but
x was an arbitrary element of P(1). So, P(1) ≃ {0, 1} ≃ 2. But 2 is a v-set, while P(1) is not.
Contradiction. 
Theorem 6.6 The Foundation principle is false: not all inhabited v-sets are disjoint from one
of their elements.
Proof : Suppose all inhabited v-sets were disjoint from one of their elements. Consider again
any x ⊆ 1 and the corresponding set B defined in the previous proof. It is inhabited and would
be disjoint from one of its elements, n. By definition of B, n ≃ 1 or n ≃ 0∧ 0 ∈ x. In the former
case, if B were disjoint from 1, meaning 0 6∈ B, then 0 6∈ x. In the latter case of course 0 ∈ x.
So again, 0 6∈ x ∨ 0 ∈ x, and x was arbitrary, so P(1) ≃ 2. Contradiction. 
Remark: As mentioned in section 1, a contrapositive form of Foundation is a theorem: no
inhabited v-set intersects all of its elements.
7 CZF through the looking glass
The assumptions (2.1) and (2.2) are a standard accessibility definition. The assumptions (5.1)
and (5.2) are a special case of inductive-recursive definition: here, the Meaningful sentences
are being inductively generated, but this depends on Truth, which is defined recursively at the
same time. However, no induction principle corresponding to (5.2) is assumed, so by themselves
(5.1) and (5.2) are actually a very weak form of inductive-recursive definition. This is roughly
analogous to the simple universe construction in Martin-Lo¨f type theory [11]. It could likely be
given a predicative justification in the stricter sense of Schu¨tte and Feferman [8], though this is
not attempted here.
In any case, such definitions are within the power of CZF. To interpret M and T set-
theoretically, define the following classes:
Φ = {〈◦M,a◦〉 | ∃f, g∈ω. a ≃ 〈◦Ξ(f, g), Z(f, g,M)◦〉 ∧ f ∈ X(M) ∧ 〈◦f, g◦〉 ∈ Y (M)}
X(M) = {f ∈ ω | ∀n∈ω. fn↓ → ∃h∈V. 〈◦fn, h◦〉 ∈M}
Y (M) = {〈◦f, g◦〉 ∈ ω2 | ∀n∈ω. fn↓ ∧ gn↓ ∧ (〈◦fn, 1◦〉 ∈M)→ ∃h∈V. 〈◦gn, h◦〉 ∈M}
Z(f, g,M) = {0 | ∀n∈ω. (fn↓ ∧ 〈◦fn, 1◦〉 ∈M)→ (gn↓ ∧ 〈◦gn, 1◦〉 ∈M)}
The Class Inductive Definition Theorem can be proven inCZF [1, §5], by which the least Φ-closed
class, M∞, can be formed. “Φ-closed” means that if M is a subset of M∞, and 〈◦M,a◦〉 ∈ Φ,
then a ∈M∞; M∞ is a subclass of any class with this property.
Take M(x) to mean ∃h∈V. 〈◦x, h◦〉 ∈M∞ and T (x) to mean 〈◦x, 1◦〉 ∈ M∞. The interpreta-
tion of V comes easily. Define the classes:
Ψ = {〈◦V, x◦〉 | x ∈ P ∩Q(V )}
P = {x ∈ ω | ∀n∈ω. xn↓ ∧ ∃h∈V. 〈◦x ⋄ n, h◦〉 ∈M∞}
Q(V ) = {x ∈ ω | ∀n∈ω. xn↓ ∧ (〈◦x ⋄ n, 1◦〉 ∈M∞ → x [n] ∈ V )}
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Form the least Ψ-closed class, V∞. Take V(x) to mean x ∈ V∞.
Lemma 7.1 M∞ is coherent. That is, if there are x, h, and h′ such that 〈◦x, h◦〉 ∈ M∞ and
〈◦x, h′◦〉 ∈M∞, then h ≃ h′.
Proof : Define the coherent subclass of M∞ as follows:
M ′ = {〈◦x, h◦〉 ∈M∞ | ∀h′∈P(1). 〈◦x, h′◦〉 ∈M∞ → h ≃ h′}
M ′ will in fact be closed under the same operator Φ that definedM∞ above. To see this, suppose
M is a subset of M ′, and a is a set such that 〈◦M,a◦〉 ∈ Φ. Then, by definition of Φ, there are
f, g ∈ ω such that a ≃ 〈◦Ξ(f, g), Z(f, g,M)◦〉. Z(f, g,M) is a valid set because M is, and Z is
otherwise given by a bounded formula. Furthermore, f ∈ X(M), so for all n, if fn is defined
then there is a j ∈ P(1) such that 〈◦fn, j◦〉 ∈ M . M is a subset of M ′, so by definition of M ′,
this j is unique (up to extensional equality). Similarly 〈◦f, g◦〉 ∈ Y (M) so for all n, if fn and gn
are defined and 〈◦fn, 1◦〉 ∈M then there is a unique k ∈ P(1) such that 〈◦gn, k◦〉 ∈M .
Now a ∈M∞ sinceM ⊆M∞ and 〈◦M,a◦〉 ∈ Φ. Suppose there is another 〈◦Ξ(f, g), h′◦〉 ∈M∞.
Then there exists a set N ⊆ M∞ such that f ∈ X(N), 〈◦f, g◦〉 ∈ Y (N) and h′ ≃ Z(f, g,N). By
definition of X , for all n, if fn is defined there is a j′ ∈ P(1) such that 〈◦fn, j′◦〉 ∈ N . But these
are the same fn’s as above, and the corresponding j’s are unique, so j′ ≃ j. There is a similar
argument for Y . Therefore Z(f, g,M) ≃ Z(f, g,N), which means that h ≃ h′.
So, h being unique, a ∈M ′, and the class M ′ is Φ-closed. But M∞ is the least such class, so
all of M∞ is coherent. 
Lemma 7.2 In M∞, (5.1) and (5.2) are true.
Proof : Suppose f ∈ X(M∞) and 〈◦f, g◦〉 ∈ Y (M∞). By the previous lemma the corresponding
〈◦fn, j◦〉 ∈ M∞ and 〈◦gn, k◦〉 ∈M∞ are unique, so by Replacement and Bounded Separation the
following are sets:
MX = {〈◦fn, j◦〉 ∈M
∞ | n ∈ ω ∧ fn↓}
MY = {〈◦gn, k◦〉 ∈M
∞ | n ∈ ω ∧ fn↓ ∧ gn↓ ∧ 〈◦fn, 1◦〉 ∈MX}
h = Z(f, g,MX ∪MY )
f ∈ X(MX ∪MY ) and 〈◦f, g◦〉 ∈ Y (MX ∪MY ), and M
∞ is Φ-closed, so 〈◦Ξ(f, g), h◦〉 ∈ M∞, so
Ξ(f, g) is Meaningful as required by (5.2). Finally, Z expresses the correct Truth conditions for
(5.1). 
Lemma 7.3 In V∞ and M∞, (2.1) and (2.2) are true.
Proof : P and Q directly encode the conditions expressed by (2.1); (2.2) follows from the
minimality of V∞. 
Meta-theorem 7.4 Assumptions (2.1), (2.2), (5.1), and (5.2), along with ECTV, are true in
a realisability interpretation, provided that the four assumptions hold (without ECTV) in the
underlying meta-theory.
Proof : The realisability interpretation is simply the standard one for first-order arithmetic, with
the additional clauses that witnesses for V , M, and T are trivial, that is:
(e  V(x)) ⇐⇒ V(x)
(e M(x)) ⇐⇒ M(x)
(e  T (x)) ⇐⇒ T (x)
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The proof of ECT0 is standard [18], and with these clauses it extends to ECTV trivially.
Moreover, since V , M, and T are almost-negative, it immediately follows that (2.1), (5.1), and
(5.2) are almost-negative. They are simply true if they are true in the meta-theory.
What remains, then, is (2.2). This is a schema, and for some instances the witness needs to
do something non-trivial, but one can be given whose validity is proven in terms of instances of
the same schema in the meta-theory. Define by general recursion:
ρ = Λe.Λx.(e′x)(Λn.(ρe)(x [n]))
Here e′ is a simple syntactic transformation introduced below for clarity of presentation. It will
follow that (ρe)x iterates e by set recursion along x, and as a result, ρ witnesses (2.2) for any φ,
provided (2.2) holds in the meta-theory.
Suppose e witnesses the antecedent of (2.2):
e  ∀x∈N. (∀n∈N. xn↓ ∧M(x ⋄ n) ∧ (T (x ⋄ n)→ φ(x [n])))→ φ(x)
This means that:
∀x, a∈N. (∀n∈N. xn↓ ∧M(x ⋄ n) ∧ (T (x ⋄ n)→ an↓ ∧ (an  φ(x [n]))))
→ (e′x)a↓ ∧ (e′x)a  φ(x)
The syntactic transformation e 7→ e′ is chosen so that e ignores the trivial witnesses for M, T ,
and xn↓. Given a set x, suppose that by way of inductive hypothesis:
∀a∈x. (ρe)a↓ ∧ (ρe)a  φ(a)
This means that
∀n∈N. T (x ⋄ n)→ (ρe)(x [n])↓ ∧ (ρe)(x [n])  φ(x [n])
And since x is Valid,
∀n∈N. xn↓ ∧M(x ⋄ n)
So, substituting Λn.(ρe)(x [n]) for a in the assumption on e, it follows that
(e′x)(Λn.(ρe)(x [n]))↓ ∧ (e′x)(Λn.(ρe)(x [n]))  φ(x)
By definition of ρ,
(ρe)x↓ ∧ (ρe)x  φ(x)
Therefore, if (2.2) holds in the meta-theory then Set Induction applies, and for all e witnessing
the antecedent of (2.2) and all sets x, (ρe)x  φ(x). This means ρ witnesses (2.2) for any φ. So,
the four assumptions all pass through from the meta-theory. 
Meta-theorem 7.5 CZF+RDC+ESP can be interpreted in CZF without Subset Collection
(CZF−) in a way which preserves almost-negative formulas of arithmetic. That is, there is a
translation of propositions φ 7→ φ∗ such that, if CZF+RDC+ESP proves φ, then CZF−
proves φ∗; furthermore, if φ is an almost-negative formula of arithmetic, CZF− proves φ↔ φ∗.
Proof : Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3 made use only of arguments available in CZF−, including the
proof of the Class Inductive Definition Theorem [1, §5] which specifically states it does not
require Subset Collection. Therefore the four assumptions can be embedded into CZF−. The
realisability interpretation of Meta-theorem 7.4 preserves almost-negative formulas of arithmetic,
and the interpretation of set theory on top of that makes CZF+RDC+ESP true. 
Remark: Relative consistency for ESP was already known [14, §8], as it was for Subset Col-
lection and RDC [15, §4]. This combined result is obtained directly without detours through
Martin-Lo¨f type theory, Kripke-Platek set theory, or a classical theory of inductive definitions.
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8 The classical world through the looking glass
Meta-theorem 7.4 also allows V , M, and T to be interpreted via realisability into a classical
system, such as ID1, which is classical first-order arithmetic plus axioms for any non-nested
positive inductive definitions. In this section, Truth and Falsehood are defined separately:
• ∀f, g∈N. (∀n∈N. fn↓ → F(fn) ∨ (T (fn) ∧ gn↓ ∧ T (gn)))→ T (Ξ(f, g))
• ∀f, g∈N. (∀n∈N. fn↓ → F(fn) ∨ (T (fn) ∧ (gn↓ → (T (gn) ∨ F(gn))))) ∧ (∃n∈N. fn↓ ∧
T (fn) ∧ (gn↓ → F(gn)))→ F(Ξ(f, g))
• ∀x∈N. (∀n∈N. xn↓ ∧ (F(x ⋄ n) ∨ (T (x ⋄ n) ∧ V(x [n])))→ V(x)
The corresponding induction principles are also assumed. These are positive mutually inductive
definitions. They can be combined into a single positive non-nested inductive definition, and this
is available in ID1. Then, M is an ordinary definition on top of this:
M(x) ⇐⇒ T (x) ∨ F(x)
Lemma 8.1 Truth and Falsehood are mutually exclusive.
Proof : In a manner similar to Lemma 7.1, define the coherent versions of Truth and Falsehood:
T ′(x) ⇐⇒ T (x) ∧ ¬F(x) F ′(x) ⇐⇒ F(x) ∧ ¬T (x)
Given f and g, first suppose, as in the definition for T , that:
∀n∈N. fn↓ → F ′(fn) ∨ (T ′(fn) ∧ gn↓ ∧ T ′(gn))
Immediately it follows that T (Ξ(f, g)), but it also follows that ¬F(Ξ(f, g)), because
¬∃n∈N. fn↓ ∧ T (fn) ∧ (gn↓ → F(gn))
So, T ′(Ξ(f, g)). Conversely suppose, as in the definition for F , that:
(∀n∈N. fn↓ → F ′(fn) ∨ (T ′(fn) ∧ (gn↓ → (T ′(gn) ∨ F ′(gn)))))
∧(∃n∈N. fn↓ ∧ T ′(fn) ∧ (gn↓ → F ′(gn)))→ F ′(Ξ(f, g))
Immediately it follows that F(Ξ(f, g)), but it also follows that ¬T (Ξ(f, g)), because the second
line implies that:
¬∀n∈N. fn↓ → F(fn) ∨ (T (fn) ∧ gn↓ ∧ T (gn))
So, F ′(Ξ(f, g)). This means that T ′ and F ′ satisfy the same mutual closure conditions as T and
F . By mutual T and F induction, it follows that:
∀x∈N. (T (x)→ T ′(x)) ∧ (F(x)→ F ′(x))
So finally,
¬∃x∈N. T (x) ∧ F(x)

Lemma 8.2 In this interpretation (2.1), (2.2), (5.1), and (5.2) are valid.
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Proof : Given any numbers f and g, suppose for all n such that fn is defined, it is True or False.
Suppose also that for all n such that fn and gn are defined, and fn is True, then gn is True or
False. This is where EM comes in: either for all n such that fn is defined and True, gn is also
defined and True. In this case, Ξ(f, g) is True. Or, there is some n such that fn is defined and
True, but gn is undefined, or defined but not True. But if gn is defined, it is True or False. So,
gn is undefined or False. In that case, Ξ(f, g) is False. So, Ξ(f, g) is Meaningful, and (5.2) holds.
Suppose for all n such that fn is defined and True, gn is also defined and True. Suppose
that Ξ(f, g) is False. Then there is an n such that fn is defined and True, and gn is undefined
or False. But gn is defined an True, so, there would be a gn which is both True and False. This
is impossible by the previous lemma. So Ξ(f, g) cannot be False; if it is Meaningful, then it is
True. Conversely if it is True, then of course it is Meaningful. Also, for all n such that fn is
defined, either fn is False, or fn is True and gn is also defined and True. Given an n such that
fn is defined and True, by the previous lemma it cannot also be False, so gn is defined and True.
So (5.1) holds.
Finally, to see that (2.1) holds, suppose for all n, xn is defined, and x ⋄ n is Meaningful, and
if x ⋄ n is True, then x [n] is a Valid set. Since by the previous lemma x ⋄ n cannot be True and
False, this is equivalent to saying that xn is defined, and either x ⋄ n is False, or x ⋄ n is True
and x [n] is Valid. That matches the above interpretation of V . And (2.2) is the corresponding
induction principle. 
Meta-theorem 8.3 CZF− and ID1 can interpret each other in a way that preserves Π2 sen-
tences of arithmetic.
Proof : The above shows that there is an interpretation in ID1 that makes the four assumptions
true, and then the realisability interpretation of Meta-theorem 7.4 preserves almost-negative
sentences of arithmetic, which includes Π2 sentences. In that interpretation CZF
− (and more)
is true. Conversely, ID1 can be interpreted into ID1(O)
i (which is HA plus a single non-
nested inductive definition for the constructive second number class) in a way which preserves
Π2 sentences of arithmetic [5]. ID1(O)
i can then be embedded into CZF− using the same Class
Inductive Definition Theorem used in the proof of Meta-theorem 7.5. 
Remark: It was already well-known that CZF and ID1 had the same proof-theoretic strength
[15, §4]. This provides a simple interpretation without detours through type-theory or Kripke-
Platek set theory. It can not, however, extend to almost-negative formulas as it did in Meta-
theorem 7.5. Markov’s principle is almost-negative, and it is not provable in CZF, whereas it is
a classical tautology therefore provable in ID1. Indeed this technique does not work to interpret
the four assumptions directly into IDi
1
. In a way, it comes down to P(1): in ID1 it can be
divided in two, and in CZF it is a class, but in IDi1 it is not expressible at all, other than by
indirect interpretation of ID1.
9 The equational interpretation
Definition 1.2 is a type of simultaneous inductive-recursive definition, as alluded to in section 1,
although in fact it does not directly fit the normal inductive-recursive schema. It may be possible
to come up with a general theory of inductive-multiple-recursive definitions. Instead this will be
forced into the normal schema by also simultaneously defining pairs of sets. For clarity, the term
“w-set” (and “w-set-pair”) will be used in this context.
Definition 9.1
• ∅ is a w-set. Nothing is an intensional member of it.
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• If f, g, h are (computable) sequences such that for all n, 〈gn, hn〉 is a w-set-pair, and fn is
a w-set whenever 〈gn, hn〉 is diagonal, then [f ; g, h] is a w-set. x is an intensional member
of it if and only if there is an n such that 〈gn, hn〉 is diagonal and fn = x.
• If x and y are w-sets, and if 〈a, b〉 is a w-set-pair for every intensional member a of x and
b of y, then 〈x, y〉 is a w-set-pair. It is diagonal if and only if for every intensional member
a of x there is an intensional b of y such that 〈a, b〉 is diagonal, and, for every intensional
b of y there is an intensional member a of x such that 〈a, b〉 is diagonal.
• All w-sets and w-set-pairs are inductively generated by these rules.
[f ; g, h] represents the set {fn | n∈N ∧ gn ≈ hn}, and ∅ is of course the empty set. This then
has the form of a simultaneous inductive-recursive definition [7].
The introduction clause for w-set-pairs has two requirements: it requires that both elements
are w-sets, but also that the intensional members of each of these are w-set-pairs. This is
necessary to make the recursive definition of diagonality valid, since it must be able to refer to
the diagonality of intensional members from each w-set, which requires these to be previously
formed w-set-pairs. Of course, after the definition is set up, it can be shown by double w-set-
induction that the second clause is redundant. Therefore w-set-pairs collapse to pairs of w-sets,
and diagonality is extensional equality. All this is just to confirm the sense that Definition
1.2 is not only constructively and predicatively valid, but actually a normal inductive-recursive
definition with a bit of plastic surgery. There is no longer any need to speak of Definition 9.1 or
w-set-pairs.
The principles of set theory could now be re-proven in terms of w-sets instead of v-sets. This
will only be sketched here. Rather, in this section, an isomorphism between w-sets and v-sets
is exhibited. It turns out the sentences built using the Ξ operator are exactly what is required.
But in the v-set context, no limiting assumption on meaning was made. To make this work,
Definition 5.1 needs to be extended by a clause that “all Meaningful conditions are inductively
built from Ξ.” Formally, this will be an induction principle corresponding to (5.2). Assume:
(∀f, g∈N. (∀n∈N. fn↓ → φ(fn)) ∧ (∀n∈N. fn↓ ∧ gn↓ ∧ T (fn)→ φ(gn))→ φ(Ξ(f, g))
)→ ∀p∈N.M(p)→ φ(p)
(9.1)
This is a schema in φ. It is not hard to see that the interpretation of section 7 already validates
this induction principle since M was constructed via the Class Inductive Definition theorem. A
similar argument applies in section 8.
Due to its limiting nature, (9.1) will inhibit a proof REA such as the proof in the next
section, and may actually allow it to be refuted. It can be considered unfaithful to the informal
reading of “meaningful” in an essential way. This restriction, and therefore Definition 1.2, might
be seen as undesirable, in much the same spirit that is often taken in classical set theory [10,
§II.2]. On the other hand, if one is not interested in large set axioms (and most constructive
mathematics can be formalised with much less than CZF+RDC+ESP) then it may be seen
as a desirable and natural completion that leaves absolutely no ambiguity as to what a set is.
Formal assumptions will now be stated. Introduce predicates W and S. W(x) should be
read “x is a w-set”. S(e, x, y) should be read “e witnesses the extensional equality of x and y as
w-sets”. Extensional equality of w-sets is defined as:
x ≈ y ↔ ∃e∈N. S(e, x, y)
It is denoted ≈, to distinguish it from ≃, extensional equality of v-sets, and =, intensional
equality of natural numbers. Some numerical coding for ∅ and [f ; g, h] is assumed. Then, the
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formal defining assumptions for W are:
W(∅) (9.2)
∀f, g, h∈N. (∀n∈N. fn↓ ∧ gn↓ ∧ hn↓ ∧W(gn) ∧W(hn) ∧ (gn ≈ hn→W(fn)))
→W([f ; g, h])
(9.3)
φ(∅) ∧ (∀f, g, h∈N. (∀n∈N. fn↓ ∧ gn↓ ∧ hn↓ ∧ φ(gn) ∧ φ(hn) ∧ (gn ≈ hn→ φ(fn)))
→ φ([f ; g, h]))→ ∀x∈N. W(x)→ φ(x)
(9.4)
(9.4) is a schema in φ. These three correspond to the first three clauses of Definition 1.2, in
order. The last clause will be expressed by axioms for S, like (4.1), but here this has to be done
by cases. The first three cases are not too hard:
∀e∈N. S(e,∅,∅) (9.5)
∀e, f, g, h∈N.W([f ; g, h])→ (S(e,∅, [f ; g, h])↔ ¬∃n∈N. gn ≈ hn) (9.6)
∀e, f, g, h∈N.W([f ; g, h])→ (S(e, [f ; g, h],∅)↔ ¬∃n∈N. gn ≈ hn) (9.7)
Finally the main case is straightforward, though verbose:
∀e, f, g, h, j, k, l∈N.W([f ; g, h]) ∧W([j; k, l])→ (S(e, [f ; g, h], [j; k, l])↔
(∀x∈N. S(xR, g(xL), h(xL)) → eLx↓
∧ S((eLx)RL, k((eLx)L), l((eLx)L))
∧ S((eLx)RR, f(xL), j((eLx)L)))
∧(∀x∈N. S(xR, k(xL), l(xL)) → eRx↓
∧ S((eRx)RL, g((eRx)L), h((eRx)L))
∧ S((eRx)RR, j(xL), f((eRx)L))))
(9.8)
The assumption ECTW is the same schema as ECT0, but where the class of almost-negative
sentences includes the predicatesW and S. The predicatesW and S and their defining assump-
tions will be used for this section only.
Similar to section 2, IND and EL can be defined. The proofs of sections 2 and 3 go through
basically as is. The operator Π can be interpreted as follows:
Π(x ≈ y, u ≈ v) ⇐⇒ 〈◦x, {u | x ≈ y}◦〉 ≈ 〈◦y, {v | x ≈ y}◦〉
There is a difficulty when it comes to ECTW that does not occur with ECTV: the predicate
IND is not almost-negative, because a w-set equality is not almost-negative. To get around
this, an equation x ≈ y is replaced by S(e, x, y) with an extra parameter e. Every S(e, x, y)
can be expressed as a different equation u ≈ v, and this can be shown in the manner of Lemma
9.5 below, using Set Induction rather than (9.1). This allows w-sets to be constructed using
S’s as conditions. This in turn allows the proofs of section 4 to go through, with the necessary
modifications. Finally, sections 5 and 6 are easy: the key was Kronecker Delta, Lemma 5.4, and
this is now trivial.
The above work-around is also the basic idea required to get an isomorphism, and this is
formally exhibited here. An equation x ≈ y is called “canonically witnessed” if there is a number
f such that x ≈ y → S(f, x, y).
Lemma 9.2 Suppose that x and y are w-sets and that x ≈ y is canonically witnessed. Suppose
also that x ≈ y implies that u and v are w-sets and that u ≈ v is canonically witnessed. Then
there are w-sets s and t such that s ≈ t is canonically witnessed, and such that s ≈ t ↔ (x ≈
y → u ≈ v).
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Proof : Define:
s = {u | ζ∈N ∧ x ≈ y}
t = {v | ζ∈N ∧ x ≈ y}
ζ is a dummy variable. s and t are valid w-sets under the stated assumptions. Clearly, s ≈
t ↔ (x ≈ y → u ≈ v). All the relevant sub-equations are canonically witnessed, so a canonical
witness for s ≈ t can be constructed. 
Lemma 9.3 Given a sequence of canonically witnessed w-set equations, there is a canonically
witnessed w-set equation which expresses that every equation in the sequence is true.
Proof : Given sequences of w-sets x and y such that xn ≈ yn is canonically witnessed for all n,
define:
u = {〈◦n, xn◦〉 | n∈N ∧ 0 ≈ 0}
v = {〈◦n, yn◦〉 | n∈N ∧ 0 ≈ 0}
Now, by the properties of set-theoretic ordered pair and finite Von Neumann ordinals, the equa-
tion 〈◦n, xn◦〉 ≈ 〈◦n′, yn′◦〉 is true if and only if n = n′ and xn ≈ yn′. It follows that u ≈ v if and
only if xn ≈ yn for all n. Moreover, an equation between any two finite Von Neumann ordinals
is canonically witnessed; this can easily be shown by induction. Also by hypothesis xn ≈ yn is
canonically witnessed. Therefore a canonical witness for u ≈ v can be constructed. 
Lemma 9.4 Given two numbers e and i, suppose that if ei is defined, it is a canonically witnessed
w-set equation, that is, (ei)RL and (ei)RR are w-sets and (ei)L is a canonical witness for (ei)RL ≈
(ei)RR. Then there is a canonically witnessed w-set equation which expresses that ei is defined
and true, that is, it expresses ei↓ ∧ (ei)RL ≈ (ei)RR.
Proof : Define:
x = 1
y = {0 | u∈N ∧ T ′(e, i, u,U(u)RL, 0) ≈ T
′(e, i, u,U(u)RR, 1}
T ′(e, i, u, a, b) =
{
a, if T(e, i, u)
b, otherwise
The equation in the definition of y is true if and only if T(e, i, u) and U(u)RL ≈ U(u)RR. So, the
equation x ≈ y is true if and only if ei↓ ∧ (ei)RL ≈ (ei)RR, as required. Now, to get a canonical
witness f , notice that all the relevant sub-equations are canonically witnessed. f just has to
produce a u such that T(e, i, u). It can do an unbounded search. If in fact x ≈ y, then ei↓, so
the search will terminate; x ≈ y → S(f, x, y), as required. 
Lemma 9.5 Any Meaningful condition can be expressed by a canonically witnessed w-set equa-
tion.
Proof : Proceed by induction using (9.1). Given f and g, take for inductive hypothesis that
when fn is defined it can be expressed by a canonically witnessed equation, and that when fn
and gn are defined and fn is True, gn can be expressed by a canonically witnessed equation.
Take any n. By Lemma 9.4, there is a canonically witnessed equation that expresses that fn
is defined and True; and also, if fn is defined and True, there is a canonically witnessed equation
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that expresses that gn is defined and True. So, by Lemma 9.2, there is a canonically witnessed
equation that expresses that if fn is defined and True, then gn is defined and True.
So, by Lemma 9.3, there is a canonically witnessed equation expressing Ξ(f, g). And finally,
by (9.1), every Meaningful condition can be expressed by a canonically witnessed equation. 
Lemma 9.6 If g and h are sequences of v-sets, and if f is a sequence such that fn is a v-set if
gn ≃ hn, then {fn | n∈N ∧ gn ≃ hn} is a v-set.
Proof : It follows from Lemmas 5.3 and 4.6 that
{fn | n∈N ∧ gn ≃ hn} = Λn.〈f(nL),R(nR, g(nL), h(nL))〉
is the required v-set. 
Meta-theorem 9.7 Definition 1.2 is isomorphic to Definitions 1.1 and 5.1 plus the assumption
that all Meaningful conditions are inductively built using Ξ. Specifically, HA+ECTV plus the
assumptions (2.1), (2.2), (5.1), (5.2), and (9.1) can interpret HA+ECTW plus the assumptions
(9.2)–(9.8), and vice versa, in a way that preserves all sentences of first-order set theory.
Proof : Given a w-set x, an equivalent v-set Wx can be constructed recursively using Empty
Set and Lemma 9.6. Then interpret:
W(x) ⇐⇒ V(Wx)
S(e, x, y) ⇐⇒ R(e,Wx,Wy)
R can in turn be interpreted in terms of T by Lemma 5.3. This will satisfy the assumptions
for w-sets. Also since V and T are almost-negative, so are W and S, therefore ECTW is also
satisfied.
The other direction works as follows: given a condition p, Lemma 9.5 gives a triple Mp =
〈e, 〈x, y〉〉. Given a v-set x, an equivalent w-set Vx can be constructed by recursively replacing
every condition p which appears with an equation (Mp)RL ≈ (Mp)RR. Then interpret:
M(p) ⇐⇒ W((Mp)RL) ∧W((Mp)RR)
T (p) ⇐⇒ S((Mp)L, (Mp)RL, (Mp)RR)
V(x) ⇐⇒ W(Vx)
Since (Mp)RL ≈ (Mp)RR is canonically witnessed by (Mp)L, the equation is interchangeable
with T (p), but T remains almost-negative. So, this satisfies the assumptions for v-sets, and V ,
M and T are almost-negative because W and S are, so ECTV is also satisfied.
It is not hard to see that the operationsV andW are also inverses up to extensional equality,
so first-order set theory is preserved. 
The formal machinery of w-sets might seem inelegant compared to that of v-sets. It might
then be imagined that if an actual construction were attempted in terms of w-sets equations, the
result would be even messier. This section closes with a brief example of a direct construction.
Assume bijective encodings Q and Q+ of the rational numbers and the positive rational
numbers, respectively. Define:
J(e, z, u, x) =
{
1 if T(e, z, u) ∧Qx < QU(u)−Q+z
0 otherwise
K(e, z, z′, u, u′) =
{
1 if T(e, z, u) ∧T(e, z′, u′) ∧ |QU(u)−QU(u′)| < max(Q+z,Q+z′)
0 otherwise
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The rational inequations involved are of course computable, so J and K are computable. Now
define:
X = Λe.{Qx | x, z, u∈N ∧ 1 ≈ J(e, z, u, x)}
Y = Λe.{〈z, z′〉 | z, z′, u, u′∈N ∧ 1 ≈ K(e, z, z′, u, u′)}
R = {Xe | e∈N ∧ ω ≈ Y e}
Viewing e as a computable partial function from Q+ to Q, it follows that
Xe ≈ {x ∈ Q | ∃z∈Q+. ez↓ ∧ x < ez − z}
The equation ω ≈ Y e expresses that
(∀z∈Q+. ez↓) ∧ (∀z, z′∈Q+. |ez − ez′| < max(z, z′))
When this equation holds, it follows that e is a Cauchy sequence, and thatXe is the corresponding
located lower cut of rationals. It can be shown in CZF that to any located lower cut there is
such a Cauchy sequence and vice versa [1, §3.6]. This does rely on Countable Choice, which is of
course valid here. So, although intensionally R was constructed in terms of Cauchy sequences,
extensionally it is the w-set of all located Dedekind reals.
10 Regular sets
The interpretation will transcend CZF if Meaning is extended to include conditions that cannot
be expressed with Ξ alone. For instance, a basic reflection principle should be sufficient to prove
the consistency of CZF. But there is a more natural assumption from which REA will follow.
The concept of a bar plays a significant role in Brouwer’s school of intuitionism. A bar is a
subset of finite sequences of natural numbers, such that every infinite sequence has at least one
of its finite prefixes belonging to it. Here a slight liberty is taken with the definition: a bar will
be a such that no infinite sequence has all of its prefixes belonging to it. Also, no form of bar
induction will be assumed. Instead the bars that are considered are those that are inductively
generated in the first place.
Assume some elementary bijection between natural numbers and finite sequences of natural
numbers, which will also be written with angle brackets. No confusion should result. The ⋆
operator will denote sequence concatenation. Also |x| will denote the length of the sequence x.
Definition 10.1
• If f〈〉 being True would imply that Λx.f(〈n〉 ⋆ x) are inductively generated bars for every
n, then, f is an inductively generated bar.
• All inductively generated bars are inductively generated by this rule.
It follows from this definition that if f〈〉 = ⊥, then f is an inductively generated bar; and, if
g is a sequence of inductively generated bars, then sup g is an inductively generated bar, where
(sup g)〈〉 = ⊤ and (sup g)(〈n〉 ⋆ x) = gnx. But the definition allows for conditions other than ⊤
and ⊥.
Definition 10.2 Ω(f) is a condition which expresses that f is an inductively generated bar. It
is Meaningful if fn is defined and Meaningful for all n.
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Formal assumptions on M and T are made following Definitions 10.1 and 10.2. In section 5
the odd numbers were used to denote applications of Ξ, and here the numerical convention that
Ω(f) = 4 · f + 2 is adopted, leaving unspecified the Meaning of conditions whose numbers are
divisible by four. Assume:
∀f ∈N. (∀n∈N. fn↓ ∧M(fn))→M(Ω(f)) (10.1)
∀f ∈N.M(Ω(f)) ∧ (T (f〈〉)→ ∀n∈N. T (Ω(f (n))))→ T (Ω(f)) (10.2)
(∀f ∈N.M(Ω(f)) ∧ (T (f〈〉)→ ∀n∈N. φ(f (n)))→ φ(f))→ (∀f ∈N. T (Ω(f))→ φ(f)) (10.3)
(10.3) is a schema in φ. The expression Λx.f(〈n〉 ⋆ x) has been abbreviated f (n). Truth for Ω is
given by a standard accessibility definition which is immediately constructively valid.
Lemma 10.3 Suppose p is Meaningful, x is a sequence, and p being True would imply that x
is an inductively generated bar. Then, Π′(p, x) is an inductively generated bar, where Π′(p, x) =
Λm.Π(p, xm).
Proof : p being True would imply that x is an inductively generated bar. So it would also imply
that x is a sequence of Meaningful conditions. That is, it would imply that xm is Meaningful
for all m, so, by Definition 3.1, Π(p, xm) is (unconditionally) Meaningful for all m. Therefore
Π′(p, x) is a sequence of Meaningful conditions, and it is Meaningful to ask if it is an inductively
generated bar.
p being True would also imply that Π(p, xm) is True if and only if xm is True. So, p being
True would imply that Π′(p, x) is equivalent to x, and so is also an inductively generated bar.
Now suppose Π′(p, x)〈〉 is True. It would follow that p is True, so Π′(p, x) would be an
inductively generated bar, and so Π′(p, x)(n) would be an inductively generated bar for all n.
Since Π′(p, x)〈〉 being True would imply that Π′(p, x)(n) is an inductively generated bar for all
n, it follows that Π′(p, x) is (unconditionally) an inductively generated bar. 
Lemma 10.4 Suppose τ is a sequence of Meaningful conditions. Then there are B(τ, x) such
that:
• B(τ, x) is Meaningful for all x.
• B(τ, x) is True if B(τ, x [n]) is True for all n such that xn is defined and such that τ(x⋄n)
is True.
• All the x’s for which B(τ, x) is True are inductively generated by this rule.
Proof : Define the conditions B(τ, x) as follows:
B(τ, x) = Ω(Λz.A(τ, x, z))
A(τ, x, z) = ⊤, if |z| < 2
A(τ, x, 〈n, u〉 ⋆ z) = Π(τ(U(u)R), A(τ,U(u)L, z)), if T(x, n, u), else ⊥
The conditions A(τ, x, z) are either equal to ⊤ or else is formed from Π and τn for some values of
n. Since τ is a sequence of Meaningful conditions, it follows that A(τ, x, z) is always Meaningful.
So by Definition 10.2, B(τ, x) is Meaningful.
Now, A(τ, x, z) = ⊤ if |z| < 2, so by the definition, Λz.A(τ, x, z) is an inductively generated
bar if and only if Λz.A(τ, x, 〈n, u〉 ⋆ z) is an inductively generated bar for all n and u. Also,
unless T(x, n, u), A(τ, x, 〈n, u〉 ⋆ z) = ⊥, so it is trivially an inductively generated bar, by the
definition. If T(x, n, u) then A(τ, x, 〈n, u〉 ⋆ z) = Π(τ(U(u)R), A(τ,U(u)L, z)). By the previous
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lemma, Λz.Π(τ(U(u)R), A(τ,U(u)L, z)) is an inductively generated bar if and only if τ(U(u)R)
being True would imply that Λz.A(τ,U(u)L, z) is an inductively generated bar.
It follows, then, Λz.A(τ, x, z) is an inductively generated bar if Λz.A(τ, x [n] , z) is an induc-
tively generated bar for all n such that xn is defined and such that τ(x ⋄ n) is True; and, this
gives all the x’s for which Λz.A(τ, x, z) is an inductively generated bar. Finally, B(τ, x) is True
if and only if Λz.A(τ, x, z) is an inductively generated bar, and this matches the last two clauses
of the lemma. 
Lemma 10.5 Suppose τ is a sequence of Meaningful conditions. Then there are conditions
W (τ, x) such that:
• W (τ, x) is Meaningful for all x.
• W (τ, x) is True if xn is defined for all n, and if W (τ, x [n]) is True for all n such that
τ(x ⋄ n) is True.
• All the x’s for which W (τ, x) is True are inductively generated by this rule.
Proof : Define the conditions W (τ, x) as follows:
W (τ, x) = Π(B(τ, x), L(τ, x))
L(τ, x) = Π(TOT (x), J(τ, x))
TOT (x) = Ξ(Λn.⊤,Λn.K(⊤, xn))
K(a, b) = a
J(τ, x) = Ξ(Λn.τ(x ⋄ n),Λn.L(τ, x [n]))
Here, B is given by the previous lemma. TOT (x) asserts that xn is always defined. J(τ, x)
asserts that L(τ, x [n]) is True for all n such that τ(x ⋄n) is True. Therefore, L(τ, x) asserts that
xn is defined for all n, and that L(τ, x [n]) is True for all n such that τ(x ⋄ n) is True. Provided
that it is Meaningful, it has the correct Truth conditions.
TOT (x) is always Meaningful. If TOT (x) is True and L(τ, x [n]) is Meaningful for all n such
that τ(x ⋄ n is True, then J(τ, x) is Meaningful. So, if L(τ, x [n]) is Meaningful for all n such
that τ(x ⋄ n) is defined and True, then L(τ, x) is Meaningful.
The previous lemma establishes an induction principle which matches a recursive condition
for L(τ, x) to be Meaningful. So, if B(τ, x) is True, then L(τ, x) is Meaningful. It follows that
W (τ, x) is always Meaningful, as claimed. 
Lemma 10.6 Suppose τ is a sequence of Meaningful conditions, and that there is a number F
such that τF is not True. Then there is a v-set V (τ) containing all and only the v-sets that can
be “built from” τ . That is:
• If all the conditions of y are in τ (that is, for all n there is an m such that τm is True if
and only if y ⋄ n is True), and all the elements of y are in V (τ), then y is in V (τ).
• All the elements of V (τ) are inductively generated by this rule.
Proof : Define the v-sets Y (τ, x) and V (τ) as follows:
Y (τ, x) = Λn.〈Y (τ, x [n]), τ(x ⋄ n)〉
V (τ) = Λx.〈Y (τ, x),W (τ, x)〉
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Here W is given by the previous lemma. Take for an inductive hypothesis that xn is defined for
all n, and that Y (τ, x [n]) is a v-set for all n such that τ(x ⋄ n) is True. Y (τ, x) would be v-set.
So, from the induction principle established by the previous lemma, it follows that Y (τ, x) is a
v-set for all x such that W (τ, x) is True. This establishes that V (τ) is a v-set.
Suppose y is a v-set and can be built from τ . Then for all n, there is an m such that y ⋄ n is
True if and only if τm is True. So by ECTV, there is an e such that
∀n∈N. en↓ ∧ (T (y ⋄ n)↔ T (τ(en)))
Also since y can be built from τ , every element of y can be built from τ . Take, for a set-inductive
hypothesis, that for every element b of y there is an a such that W (τ, a) is True and b ≃ Y (τ, a).
So again by ECTV, there is an f such that
∀n∈IND(y). fn↓ ∧ T (W (τ, fn)) ∧ y [n] ≃ Y (τ, fn)
So, define:
z = Λn.〈U(nR)L, T0(x, nL, nR,U(nR)R)〉
T0(x, n, u, p) = p if T(x, n, u) else F
x = Λn.〈fn, en〉
en is always defined. If τ(en) is True then so is y ⋄ n, so fn is defined and W (τ, fn) is True.
The proof of Lemma 3.4 applies with minor changes to show that zn is defined for all n, and
that, if τ(z ⋄ n) is True for some n, then z [n] = fn′ for some n′ ∈ IND(y). By the properties
of f , W (τ, fn′) is True for all n′ ∈ IND(y). So, by the previous lemma, W (τ, z) is True, and as
established above, this means that Y (τ, z) is a v-set.
Conversely, for all n′ ∈ IND(y) there is an n such that τ(z ⋄ n) is True and z [n] = fn′,
and from the properties of f it follows that y [n′] ≃ Y (τ, z [n]). So, Y (τ, z) ≃ y. Finally, by
Set Induction, it follows that for any v-set y which can be built from τ , there is a z such that
W (τ, z) is True and Y (τ, z) ≃ y, which means that V (τ) contains y. V (τ) contains only such
v-sets, because when W (τ, x) is True, Y (τ, x) is well-founded and directly built from τ . 
Lemma 10.7 Suppose, as in the previous lemma, that τ is a sequence of Meaningful conditions,
and that there is a number F such that τF is not True. Then V (τ), the v-set of all v-sets which
can be built from τ , is in fact “regular”: inhabited, transitive, and a model of Strong Collection.
That is, given an element x of V (τ) and any v-set R which is a binary relation such that to every
element of x there is an element of V (τ) related to it by R, then, there is an element y of V (τ)
which contains only v-sets related to elements of x, and which contains, for each element of x,
at least one v-set related to it.
Proof : F is a condition in τ which is not True, so the empty v-set, at least, can be built from
it, and therefore V (τ) is inhabited. Transitivity follows from the fact that if a v-set can be
built from τ , then by definition so can all its elements. The previous lemma shows that V (τ),
Λn.⊤ and τ mirror the assumptions (2.1) and (2.2) on V , M, and T , respectively. The proof
of Theorem 4.1 (including Lemma 3.4) only required these assumptions plus the fact that ⊥ is
Meaningful and not True. R can be used as the relation ψ, even though R may be external to
V (τ), because ψ was allowed to be arbitrary. So, Strong Collection applies inside V (τ). 
Lemma 10.8 For every v-set, there is a sequence of Meaningful conditions from which the v-set
can be built.
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Proof : Define h(x) as follows:
h(x) = Λm.h′(x,m)
h′(x,m) = ⊤ if |m| < 2
h′(x, 〈n, u〉 ⋆ m) = Π(U(u)R, h
′(U(u)L,m)), if T(x, n, u), else ⊥
Now, h′(x, 〈n, u〉⋆m) = Π(U(u)R, h
′(U(u)L,m)) if T(x, n, u). h
′(U(u)L, 〈〉) = ⊤, so h
′(x, 〈n, u〉)
is True if and only if U(u)R is True and T(x, n, u). So h(x) contains the conditions x ⋄ n for
all n such that xn is defined. If x ⋄ n is True, then, Π(x ⋄ n, h′(x [n] ,m)) is True if and only if
h′(x [n] ,m) is True. So, h(x) also contains all the conditions in h(x [n]) for all n such that xn is
defined and x ⋄ n is True.
Given a v-set x, take for a set-inductive hypothesis that for every element y of x, h(y) is a
sequence of Meaningful conditions from which y can be built. It follows that h(x) is a sequence
of Meaningful conditions. h(x) contains all the conditions in h(x [n]) for all n ∈ IND(x), so
every element of x can be built from h(x). h(x) also contains the conditions x ⋄ n. So, x can be
built from h(x).
By Set Induction, then, any v-set x can be built from the sequence of Meaningful conditions
h(x). 
Theorem 10.9 (Regular Extension) Every v-set is contained in a regular v-set.
Proof : Given any v-set x, there is a sequence of Meaningful conditions from which x can be
built. This can be trivially extended to include ⊥. There is a regular v-set containing all and
only the v-sets which can be built from this sequence. By construction of this sequence, x itself
is such a v-set, so it is contained in this regular v-set. 
11 CZF +REA through the looking glass
The interpretation of section 7 can be extended to include the assumptions (10.1), (10.2), and
(10.3). First an inductive class definition is given to capture the Truth conditions of Ω. Define
the classes:
Υ(M) = {〈◦B, f◦〉 | f ∈ W (M) ∧B ≃ V (f,M)}
V (f,M) ={f (n) | n ∈ ω ∧ 〈◦f〈〉, 1◦〉 ∈M}
W (M) ={f ∈ ω | ∀n∈ω. fn↓ ∧ ∃h∈V. 〈◦fn, h◦〉 ∈M}
Form the least Υ(M)-closed class, B(M)∞. The role of REA will be to show that B(M)∞ is in
fact a set when M is. Then define the class:
Φ′ = Φ ∪ {〈◦M,a◦〉 | ∃f ∈W (M). a ≃ 〈◦Ω(f), {0 | f ∈ B(M)∞}◦〉}
Φ is the same operator as in section 7, but now M∞ is the least Φ′-closed class. V∞ is defined
the same way, and V , M, and T are interpreted the same way.
Lemma 11.1 Suppose that M is a subset of ω × P(1). Then:
• If f ∈ W (M), and if 〈◦f〈〉, 1◦〉 ∈ M implies that f (n) ∈ B(M)∞ for all n ∈ ω, then,
f ∈ B(M)∞.
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• All the elements of B(M)∞ are inductively generated by this rule.
Proof : First, note that if f ∈W (M), then f (n) ∈W (M) for all n. Now, suppose
〈◦f〈〉, 1◦〉 ∈M → ∀n∈ω. f (n) ∈ B(M)∞
It follows that V (f,M) ⊆ B(M)∞, and so f ∈ B∞M , since B(M)
∞ is Υ(M)-closed. Conversely,
if there is a class B′ such that
∀f ∈W (M). (〈◦f〈〉, 1◦〉 ∈M → ∀n∈ω. f (n) ∈ B′)→ f ∈ B′
Then, B′ is Υ(M)-closed, and B(M)∞ is the least such class so B(M)∞ ⊆ B′, giving the required
induction principle. 
Lemma 11.2 If M is a subset of ω × P(1), then B(M)∞ is a set.
Proof : First, V (f,M) is indeed a set, being given by a bounded formula. W (M) is also a set,
because the quantification over V can be replaced by quantification over ran(M), the range of
M ; since M is a set, ran(M) is a set by Replacement and the properties of the set-theoretic
ordered pair.
The operator Υ(M) is “bounded”: for a given B, the class of all conclusions f is given by a
set, namely {f ∈ W (M) | B ≃ V (f,M)}; and, the class of all possible premise sets B is given
by a set, namely {V (f,M) | f ∈ W (M)}. Using Regular Extension, it can be shown that if an
operator is bounded, the class it inductively defines is actually a set [1, §5]. 
Lemma 11.3 M∞ is coherent.
Proof : As with Lemma 7.1, define M ′ as the coherent subclass of M∞. Now suppose there is a
setM ⊆M ′ and a set a such that 〈◦M,a◦〉 ∈ Φ′. Lemma 7.1 takes care of the Ξ case to show that
a ∈M ′. So consider the Ω case: there is an f ∈W (M) and an h ∈ P(1) such that a ≃ 〈◦Ω(f), h◦〉
and h ≃ {0 | f ∈ B(M)∞}.
By definition of W (M), for all n ∈ ω, fn is defined and there is a j such that 〈◦fn, j◦〉 ∈ M .
M ⊆ M ′, so this j is unique. Now a ∈ M∞ since M ⊆ M∞ and 〈◦M,a◦〉 ∈ Φ′. Suppose there
is another 〈◦Ω(f), h′◦〉 ∈ M∞. Then there exists a set N ⊆ M∞ such that f ∈ W (N), and
h′ ≃ {0 | f ∈ B(N)∞}. By definition of W , for all n, fn is defined and there is a j′ ∈ P(1) such
that 〈◦fn, j′◦〉 ∈ N . But these are the same fn’s as for W (M), and the corresponding j’s are
unique, so j′ ≃ j. Therefore f ∈ B(M)∞ ↔ f ∈ B(N)∞, so h′ ≃ h.
So again, h being unique, a ∈ M ′, and the class M ′ is Φ′-closed. But M∞ is the least such
class, so all of M∞ is coherent. 
Lemma 11.4 In M∞, (10.1), (10.2), and (10.3) are true.
Proof : Suppose f is a sequence of Meaningful conditions. Then f ∈ W (M∞). By the previous
lemma all the corresponding 〈◦fn, h◦〉 ∈ M∞ are unique, so by Replacement, the following is a
set:
MV = {〈◦fn, j◦〉 ∈M
∞ | n ∈ ω}
B(MV )
∞ is a set by Lemma 11.2, and M∞ is Φ-closed so 〈◦Ω(f), {0 | f ∈ B(MV )
∞}◦〉 ∈ M∞,
so Ω(f) is Meaningful, as required by (10.1). Furthermore, f ∈ B(MV )
∞ expresses the correct
Truth conditions for (10.2) and (10.3), as shown by Lemma 11.1. 
Meta-theorem 11.5 Assumptions (2.1), (2.2), (5.1), (5.2), (10.1), (10.2), and (10.3), along
with ECTV, are true in a realisability interpretation, provided that the seven assumptions hold
(without ECTV) in the underlying meta-theory.
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Proof : It is the same interpretation as in Meta-theorem 7.4, and the previous proof disposes
of ECTV and the first four assumptions. Moreover, (10.1) and (10.2) are trivially disposed of,
being almost-negative, in the same way as (2.1), (5.1), and (5.2). What remains is (10.3), which
in some instances has a non-trivial witness, and it is disposed of in a way similar to (2.2). Define:
ρ = Λe.Λf.(e′f)(Λn.(ρe)(f (n)))
Here e′ is a simple syntactic transformation introduced below for clarity of presentation. It will
follow that (ρe)f iterates e by bar recursion along f , and as a result, ρ witnesses (10.3) for any
φ, provided (10.3) holds in the meta-theory. This is argued in a way which is similar to Lemma
7.4.
Suppose e witnesses the antecedent of (10.3):
e  ∀f ∈N.M(Ω(f)) ∧ (T (f〈〉)→ ∀n∈N. φ(f (n)))→ φ(f)
which means that
∀f, a∈N. (M(Ω(f)) ∧ (T (f〈〉)→ ∀n∈N. an↓ ∧ (an  φ(f (n))))
→ (e′f)a↓ ∧ (e′f)a  φ(f)
The transformation e 7→ e′ causes e to ignore the trivial witnesses for M and T . Suppose, by
way of inductive hypothesis, that f is a sequence of Meaningful conditions, and that:
T (f〈〉)→ ∀n∈N. (ρe)(f (n))↓ ∧ (ρe)(f (n))  φ(f (n))
By (10.1),M(Ω(f)), so, substituting Λn.(ρe)(f (n)) for a in the assumption on e, it follows that:
(e′f)(Λn.(ρe)(f (n))↓ ∧ (e′f)(Λn.(ρe)(f (n))  φ(f)
By the definition of ρ:
(ρe)f↓ ∧ (ρe)f  φ(f)
If the induction principle of (10.3) holds in the underlying meta-theory, it follows that:
∀f ∈N. T (Ω(f))→ (ρe)f↓ ∧ (ρe)f  φ(f)
This is the consequent of (10.3). So, ρ witnesses (10.3), provided the same schema holds in the
underlying meta-theory. 
Meta-theorem 11.6 CZF+REA interprets CZF+REA+RDC+ESP in a way that pre-
serves almost-negative sentences of arithmetic.
Proof : Lemmas 7.2 and 7.3 work here as well, and Lemma 11.4 uses only arguments available in
CZF+REA. Therefore the seven assumptions can be interpreted into CZF+REA. The re-
alisability interpretation of Meta-theorem 11.5 preserves almost-negative formulas of arithmetic,
and in this interpretation CZF+REA+RDC+ESP is true. 
Remark: Again relative consistency for ESP [14, §8], and for RDC [15, §5] was already known,
though this combined result is obtained without detours. Here there is no point in considering
CZF− +REA: REA implies Subset Collection [1, §10].
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12 Extended Church’s Thesis and Omniscience
The assumptions in this paper are unproblematic both classically and constructively, with the
exception of ECT. One of the consequences of even weak constructive forms of Church’s Thesis
is:
¬∀e, i∈N. ((∃u∈N. T(e, i, u)) ∨ (¬∃u∈N. T(e, i, u)))
Almost all mathematicians think classically, and form that perspective this assertion, and there-
fore ECT, can only be false. But it is provably consistent, and can be understood indirectly in
terms of a realisability interpretation in a classical meta-theory, as in section 8. When it is set
up this way, not only is ECT valid, but so is Markov’s Principle. No form of this principle was
needed in this article, though, so it isn’t actually necessary that the meta-theory be classical.
This is why things still work when the realisability interpretations are set up in constructive
meta-theories, as in sections 7 and 11.
But it isn’t actually necessary to have a meta-theory at all. It is possible to understand ECT
literally instead. This does then force literal acceptance of the indeterminacy of the halting
problem. Of course this raises some philosophical questions, but at the same time, it disposes
of others. A well-known one is the question of non-standard models of first-order arithmetic.
It is disposed of by adapting Tennenbaum’s theorem to ECT, from which it follows that there
simply aren’t any non-standard models [13, §4.1]. A less well-known one, which perhaps this
article will help make better known, is the justification of set theory. The principles of set
theory are by no means self-evident, even from a classical point of view. They are taken as
axioms. They can be argued for in various ways, such as in terms of their consequences [10, §I].
The fact that they are in turn provable consequences of ECT plus a simple, precise definition
(and perhaps one with no non-standard models) disposes of this issue. Furthermore since the
definition is entirely numerical, it also disposes of the ontology of mathematical entities other
than the natural numbers.
Thus the principles of set theory refer to clearly defined objects, they mean what they say,
and they are not axioms, but theorems. Taking ECT at face value allows set theory to be taken
at face value. This point of view has some claim to the term realism. Now, it may be objected
that if the natural numbers really exist, the halting problem simply must be determinate. A
good answer to this should involve a proper account of realism in mathematics, and is beyond
the scope of this author. Instead, it will be shown that even if determinacy of the halting problem
is conceded, not much is lost.
Richman introduced a weaker assumption that has many of the consequences of Church’s
Thesis [16]. In summary, often a constructive proof involving Church’s Thesis is really only
relying on the fact that the computable partial sequences can be computably enumerated. The
adjective “computable” is actually inessential. It would work just as well with the assumption
that the X-able partial sequences can be X-ably enumerated. This is indeed exactly what is
being used here to get a numerical interpretation.
Another way of looking at this is that absolute computability can be replaced with com-
putability relative to some unspecified oracle O. Consider the sets of the form {fn | n∈N∧gn ≃
hn}, or {fn | n∈N∧ (pn is True)}, where the sequences are now only required to be computable
relative to O. The partial functions which are computable relative to O can be enumerated com-
putably relative to O, so this can still be formalised entirely numerically. Replace the absolute
predicate T with a relativised predicate TO, of which it is only assumed that it is decidable,
univocal in its output, and complete under, but not necessarily limited to, the usual computable
operations. Define ECTO
0
to be the same schema as ECT0:
(∀n∈N. φ(n)→ ∃m∈N. ψ(n,m))→ ∃e∈N. ∀n∈N. φ(n)→ en↓ ∧ ψ(n, en)
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But now redefine the notations en and en↓ to refer to the predicate TO rather than just T.
Similarly ECTO
V
can be defined, and the reader can check that all the proofs of sections 2-6
go through otherwise unchanged. In the relativised interpretation, some extra sentences might
be decidable on account of O, but CZF+RDC+ESP is still validated. For instance if it is
additionally assumed that O is able to (but again, not necessarily limited to being able to) solve
the halting problem, then the result is a consistent extension of CZF+RDC+ESP with a
so-called Omniscience principle:
∀x∈N. φ(x) ∨ ¬φ(x)
where φ is any Σ1 sentence of arithmetic, from which of course it follows that the halting problem
is determinate.
To see that this really is a consistent theory, interpret it back into plain CZF. Now, the direct
embedding of section 7 will longer work, since TO is not actually decidable for any non-trivial
O. On the other hand, the embedding into ID1 of section 8 was already classical, and stands
with just the change in notation mentioned for this O. And if it is further objected that if the
natural numbers really exist, then Σ2 sentences must also be determinate, then this embedding
can be trivially extended to accommodate:
Meta-theorem 12.1 For any fixed n, CZF− can interpret CZF+RDC+ESP, plus Omni-
science for all Σn sentences of arithmetic, in a way that preserves the Π2 sentences of arithmetic.
Proof : For n fixed, the truth predicate for Σn sentences can be defined in classical first-order
arithmetic. So an appropriate TO can be non-inductively defined. Therefore T , M and V can
be defined with a non-nested inductive definitions in ID1, allowing CZF+RDC+ESP plus
the required Omniscience principle to be interpreted, as in Meta-theorem 8.3; and again, CZF−
can indirectly interpret ID1. 
Corollary 12.2 CZF− proves the same Π2 sentences of arithmetic as CZF+RDC+ESP
plus Omniscience for all sentences of first-order arithmetic.
Proof : Omniscience for prenex sentences is sufficient to prove the prenex normal form theorem
for all sentences of first-order arithmetic. The conclusion now follows by (constructive) compact-
ness: any given proof of a Π2 sentence could only appeal to prenex-Omniscience a finite number
of times, so, that proof would work with Σn-Omniscience for some finite n. 
It would be nicer to have a direct interpretation for the corollary, but this is not attempted
here. There is further to go anyway. Hyperarithmetic sentences can be considered. At some point
in the hyperarithmetic hierarchy, the required Omniscience principle necessarily will transcend
CZF. Still, in general, if there is a system with classical logic which can define the truth
predicate for a certain class of sentences, and then inductively define T , M and V on top of it,
then, CZF+RDC+ESP plus Omniscience for that class of sentences could still be interpreted
in that classical system. Then it becomes a matter of interpreting that classical system in a
constructive system. This would in particular apply to the hyperarithmetic hierarchy up to α.
Perhaps even a modest critical point can be expected after which the assumption that α is well-
founded would be sufficient to prove the consistency of CZF+RDC+ESP plus Omniscience
for the hyperarithmetic hierarchy up to α.
A proper analysis of this is not attempted here either. The relativisation can be applied even
beyond this. For example, it is beyond the ability of anything in the hyperarithmetic hierarchy to
decide whether computable relations are well-founded (Kleene’s O). Yet there is still a consistent
extension of CZF+RDC+ESP for the corresponding Omniscience principle:
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Meta-theorem 12.3 ID2(O)
i (which is HA plus an inductive definition for the construc-
tive third number class) can interpret CZF+RDC+ESP, plus Omniscience for the well-
foundedness of computable relations, in a way that preserves Π2 sentences of arithmetic.
Proof : The well-foundedness predicate for computable relations can be defined with a classical
non-nested inductive definition. Therefore with a second level of inductive definition, T , M
and V can be defined over an appropriate TO, as in Meta-theorem 8.3. This form of inductive
definition is possible in ID2, which in turn can be interpreted in ID2(O)
i [5]. 
It is clear that this doesn’t represent the limit of relativisation. It is straightforward to
accommodate higher constructive number classes, for instance.
Now, no matter what, givenTO, the halting problem relativised to O can always be expressed,
and no oracle can ever solve its own relativised halting problem. So, it always be true that:
¬∀e, i∈N. (∃u∈N. TO(e, i, u)) ∨ (¬∃u∈N. TO(e, i, u))
In other words, some relativised halting problem is still indeterminate. But only assumptions on
what O can decide ever need to be made, never assumptions on what O is limited to. Therefore
if something about the natural numbers ought to be determinate, it can be assumed so, and it
seems that this relativised indeterminacy is of no consequence.
At least, there is no consequence as long as only the natural numbers are considered. The
story is different for the real numbers. There is a consequence of the above, which therefore
cannot be avoided by any relativisation:
¬∀x∈NN. (∃n∈N. x(n) = 0) ∨ (¬∃n∈N. x(n) = 0)
This is the negation of the so-called Limited Principle of Omniscience (LPO). Even weaker
Omniscience principles of this kind are considered and refuted by Richman [17] using weaker
forms of Church’s thesis, and the refutations may still work with the relativised form. The
difference in kind here is that LPO and its weakenings no longer refer to a well-defined class
of sentences involving natural numbers, rather, they demand a certain type of determinacy for
arbitrary sequences of numbers. The consequences of LPO and its kind are felt in analysis rather
than number theory [9].
Therefore I believe that if there is a philosophical issue here, it has to come from an ontology
of real numbers, which might demand LPO, or of sets in general, which might require P(1) ≃ 2
or the existence of classically uncountable (that is, non-subcountable) sets. There should be no
objection solely on the basis of an ontology of the natural numbers, which the good lord created.
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